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ABSTRACT
Enhancing Therapists’ Clinical Judgments of Client Progress
Subsequent to Objective Feedback
By
Michael M. Haderlie
Dr. Chrisopher Heavey, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Although it is intuitive that the judgments made by mental-health clinicians
become increasingly accurate as they gain clinical experience, research has demonstrated
only minimal effects of experience on clinical judgment. Feedback regarding the
accuracy of judgments is widely considered to be an essential component in developing
clinical judgment. However, very little research has systematically examined whether the
provision of feedback following judgments leads to increased judgment accuracy. The
current research explored the effects of providing feedback to therapists regarding client
progress on the accuracy of therapists’ judgments of change. The effect of feedback on
therapists’ confidence ratings regarding such judgments was also examined. Ten
therapists at two on-campus outpatient clinics were randomly assigned to feedback (FB)
or no-feedback (NFB) conditions. Immediately following each therapy session,
therapists made judgments regarding the direction and magnitude of client progress.
Therapists in the FB condition subsequently received feedback regarding clients’
progress based upon a self-report measure of distress. The small size of the sample and
correspondingly low statistical power made significance testing impractical. Thus the
iii

results were examined in terms of effect sizes and should be considered exploratory.
Results suggested that feedback did not improve judgment accuracy, as therapists in the
NFB condition demonstrated greater improvement in accuracy over time. Therapists
were found to be generally overconfident regarding the accuracy of their judgments.
Feedback tended to reduce confidence ratings over time. Additionally, clients of
therapists in the FB condition appeared to improve at a faster rate than clients of
therapists in the NFB condition, consistent with previous research regarding the
therapeutic effects of progress feedback. Finally, the number of judgments made by
individual therapists was positively related to judgment accuracy, suggesting that
repetition with the specific judgment task was beneficial. Results are discussed in terms
of applications of feedback in training settings and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The clinical judgments made by mental-health clinicians, and the process by
which such judgments are made, have long been a source of empirical scrutiny (e.g.,
Meehl, 1954). Clinical judgment entails a process of integrating data and observations
that has been described as informal, subjective, and impressionistic (Bell & Mellor,
2009). A large body of research in the field of psychology is related to the relative merits
of the clinical approach to decision making as compared to statistical techniques. In such
research, the validity (accuracy) of decisions made on the basis of clinical judgment is
compared to the validity of decisions reached through the application of statistical
methods. Results have consistently favored formulaic, statistical techniques (e.g.,
Ægisdóttir et al., 2006; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1954),
leading some to conclude that clinical judgment is seriously flawed and unreliable (e.g.,
Dawes, 1994; Faust & Ziskin, 1988).
A closely related research question has been the extent to which clinicians
develop improved clinical judgment as they acquire clinical experience. Although it
seems intuitive that clinicians become more accurate in their decisions with experience,
most results have not generally supported such a relationship (Dawes, 1989, 1994; Faust,
1994; Faust & Ziskin, 1988; Garb, 1998; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Wedding & Faust, 1989).
Didactic training specific to judgment tasks (e.g., training in the MMPI) does result in
improved judgmental accuracy when clinicians are compared to lay judges with no such
training; however, additional clinical experience beyond initial training has rarely
resulted in subsequent increases in the validity of judgments (reviewed in Garb, 1998).
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Recent meta-analytic results (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009)
suggest that experience may in fact have a small positive effect overall on clinical
judgment.
The relative inferiority of clinical judgment as compared to statistical techniques,
coupled with the widely-accepted view that clinical judgment does not improve with
experience (Lichtenberg, 1997), has led to skepticism toward clinical judgment among
many researchers in the field of psychology. Westen and Weinberger (2004) coined the
term clinicism (cynicism toward the clinician) to refer to a belief that little may be
learned from clinical practice or experience. The degree to which such a belief is actually
held has been debated (e.g., Garb & Grove, 2005). At any rate, researchers have
increasingly recognized the need to move beyond descriptions of the limitations and
flaws of clinical judgment in order to develop practices designed to improve clinical
judgment. Such efforts are especially important given that clinical judgment is often
considered the foundation of clinical practice (Ridley & Shaw-Ridley, 2009).
Additionally, adequate statistical models have not been developed for a majority of the
decisions made by clinicians. Therefore, the ability of clinicians to apply clinical
judgment in making valid judgments for individual clients remains of utmost importance.
Relatively little research has evaluated systematic efforts to increase the accuracy
of clinical judgment. Bell and Mellor (2009) noted that “although the debate over
clinical versus statistical prediction may have achieved a significant degree of theoretical
sophistication, it has largely failed to guide clinicians in improving their judgement [sic]
accuracy” (p. 114). One potential method of improving clinical judgment is specific
training regarding assessment procedures that incorporate research on judgment and
2

decision making. Although such methods have received only limited attention, some
preliminary evidence suggests that such didactic training may lead to increased judgment
accuracy (Meier, 1999; Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009).
Perhaps the most frequently-suggested means of improving clinical judgment is
the provision of corrective feedback during training on judgment tasks. Many authors
(e.g., Faust, 1991; Garb, 1998; Lichtenberg, 1997) have argued that it is hard for
clinicians to learn from their clinical experience because they do not receive feedback.
Garb and Grove (2005) suggested that even when practitioners do receive feedback, it is
often biased and subjective. Some decision-making models (e.g., the terminal insight
model; Dawes, 1994) suggest that it is impossible for clinicians to improve the validity of
their judgments without receiving feedback. Sapyta, Riemer, and Bickman (2005)
compared clinical training that does not include feedback to attempting to learn archery
while blindfolded. Spengler (1998) asserted, “To ensure judgment accuracy as a local
clinical scientist, some form of feedback mechanism is needed” (p. 932).
Despite the widely-held belief that feedback is a necessary ingredient in the
development of clinical judgment, research examining the effects of feedback on clinical
judgment is surprisingly rare. Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, and colleagues’
(2009) meta-analysis of 75 clinical judgment studies included only two studies in which
feedback about accuracy was included as a potential moderator of judgment accuracy.
Additionally, judgment studies that systematically vary the availability of feedback have
rarely been conducted (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, & Maugherman, 2009).
The purpose of the current research was to examine the effects of feedback on the
accuracy of clinical judgments through an experimental design. The specific type of
3

clinical judgment examined was judgments about client progress over the course of
psychotherapy. Although judgment research has largely focused on decisions made
during the initial stage of therapy (e.g., diagnosis, treatment planning), the continuous
and accurate evaluation of client response throughout therapy is essential to positive
therapy outcomes (Hatfield & Ogles, 2006). Decisions regarding the course of therapy,
alterations to the treatment plan, and the timing of termination are based on the
clinician’s judgment of client progress. Clinicians generally make such judgments on the
basis of relatively subjective indicators including behavioral observations or clients’ selfreports of change. However, the use of outcome measures as an aid in monitoring client
progress has become increasingly common (Hatfield & Ogles, 2004). A significant body
of research indicates that the use of outcome measures throughout therapy leads to
improved clinical outcomes, especially for clients who initially do not respond well to
treatment (Brodey et al., 2005; Lambert, 2007; Slade et al., 2006). Given such positive
effects of feedback on client outcomes, as well as the widely-held belief that feedback is
positively related to judgment, it was hypothesized that feedback regarding outcome
questionnaires results in improvements in clinical judgment.
In the present study, the accuracy of clinicians’ judgments regarding their clients’
progress in therapy was evaluated. A standardized outcome questionnaire was utilized at
each session as an objective indicator of the change in clients’ overall distress and
dysfunction. A randomized half of clinicians received feedback results from the outcome
questionnaire, while the other half of clinicians did not receive feedback. It was
anticipated that clinicians who received weekly feedback would make more accurate
judgments regarding client progress than those who did not receive feedback. Additional
4

research questions included the effects of feedback on confidence, the effects of feedback
on client progress, and the relationship between the accuracy of judgments made by a
clinician and client outcomes.

5

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Clinical Judgment and Decision Making
From the moment of first contact with a new client to the conclusion of service
provision, clinicians must weigh information in order to make decisions that will benefit
the client. The ability of clinicians to make accurate and useful decisions is important to
all clinical practice; indeed, it is the assumed ability of mental health professionals to
make more valid decisions than untrained individuals that allows them to charge for their
services. The validity of clinical decision making is dependent upon the clinical
judgment of the clinician. Given its ubiquitous role in service provision, clinical
judgment has been described as the foundation of psychological practice (Gambrill, 2005;
Ridley & Shaw-Ridley, 2009). Clinical judgment is also among the most widelyresearched topics in applied psychology. However, it is notable that judgment research in
psychology is less advanced than similar research in other fields (e.g., medicine; Garb,
1998).
Defining Clinical Judgment
Clinical judgment and decision making are closely related, given that the applied
product of clinical judgment is a decision. Research on both judgments and decisions is
therefore generally referred to as judgment research. Clinical judgment is a process of
critical thinking that is utilized to integrate all available data in order to make a valid
decision. The term clinical judgment originated from early work comparing the
judgments made by clinicians to decisions reached through the application of statistical,
or actuarial, methods. Clinical judgment therefore refers to a process of data aggregation
6

that is informal and unstructured, as compared to more formal statistical methods (Meehl,
1954; Westen & Weinberger, 2004). Grove and Meehl (1996) described clinical
judgment as relying “on human judgment that is based on informal contemplation and,
sometimes, discussion with others” (p. 293). Clinical judgments therefore involve
idiographic, multidimensional conceptualizations of an individual, rather than nomothetic
or probabilistic generalizations (Bell & Mellor, 2009). Clinical judgment therefore
incorporates sources of data such as relevant research evidence, clinicians’ clinical
experience, and various types of information about the client for whom a decision is to be
made. A parallel term is clinical prediction, which refers to the application of clinical
judgment to predict future or concurrent outcomes.
Clinical judgment also refers, more generally, to the judgments, inferences,
observations, and practices of clinicians (Westen & Weinberger, 2004). Clinicians make
decisions in varied contexts across all forms of clinical practice. The initial decision
made in most therapeutic settings is the assignment of a clinical diagnosis. Decisions are
also made early in therapy in order to determine whether treatment is needed, and if so,
what kind of treatment may be beneficial. The treatment planning phase of therapy also
requires several decisions, such as forming a case conceptualization, identifying
appropriate goals for therapy, and selecting optimal interventions. Throughout the course
of therapy, clinicians must make ongoing determinations regarding client progress and
outcome. These evaluations are essential in order to decide whether to alter the treatment
plan, or in the case of progress, whether to terminate therapy.

7

Judgment of Client Progress
Despite the importance of accurate clinical decisions throughout therapy, most
clinical judgment research in psychology has focused on the accuracy of diagnostic
assessments (Hatfield, 2007). The focus of clinical judgment in the current research is
judgment regarding client change during the course of therapy. Evaluating client
progress from week to week is essential to significant decisions. For example, the
judgment that a client has not progressed or has deteriorated might lead a clinician to
alter the treatment plan by shifting intervention strategies, recommending medication, or
consulting. On the other hand, judgment that a client has improved is necessary in order
to initiate the process of termination. In addition, judgment regarding client change from
one week to another is important in evaluating the impact of specific interventions for a
particular client. Monitoring of client progress throughout the course of therapy is
especially important given that an estimated 5% to 10% of psychotherapy clients finish
therapy in worse condition than when they began (Lambert & Ogles, 2004).
Additionally, Kendall, Kipnis, and Otto-Salaj (1992) found that even when therapists
considered clients to be deteriorated, a majority of therapists did not alter their treatment
plans.
Several sources of information are available to clinicians in the context of
evaluating client progress during therapy. The most ubiquitous data source is clients’
own verbal reports regarding their relative change from one week to another. Additional
sources of information may include behavioral observations during session, significant
others’ reports, process measures (e.g., standardized questionnaires assessing constructs
like alliance or client satisfaction), and outcome measures.
8

It is apparent that various sources of data regarding client change yield different,
and sometimes contradictory, perspectives on the progress made. Judgment of client
progress is therefore highly influenced by the types of information that are available or
sought by the clinician. For example, Hole (1972) compared clinician ratings of change
with change in MMPI-2 results over the course of therapy for 50 depressed patients.
Results indicated that there was no correlation between profile changes and clinical
assessment. However, the study was constrained by methodological problems, including
the use of one 3-point scale as the clinical rating of change. Weiss, Rabinowitz, and
Spiro (1996) reviewed 23 studies which examined the relationship between client and
therapist estimates of change. Results were variable, indicating that the relationship
between client and therapist perspectives is not always strong.
Hatfield and Ogles (2006) mailed a clinical vignette to 810 practicing
psychologists and asked them to rate the degree to which various information sources
influenced their resulting treatment decisions. Clinicians self-reported that they weighed
client verbal reports and their own observations of the client much more heavily than
other data sources. However, quantitative analyses of responses to systematically
manipulated variables suggested that client verbal reports and outcome measures had
equal impacts on decisions. Negative information from any source was found to
influence clinicians more than positive information. Consistently, therapists in other
studies have rated negative feedback as more valuable than positive feedback (Brodey et
al., 2005; Haderlie & Kern, 2009).
In addition to the source of information, judgment of client progress is dependent
upon characteristics of individual clinicians. Therapists of different orientations
9

emphasize distinct criteria in evaluating progress. For example, behavioral therapists are
likely to seek information regarding symptom frequency and severity as a means of
evaluating change, whereas dynamic therapists may base judgments on observations of
clients’ interpersonal behaviors in session. Kendall and colleagues (1992) found that
cognitive-behavioral therapists waited until 6 to 8 months of therapy to determine that
clients were not making progress, but dynamic therapists did not make such a
determination until 14 months of therapy, on average. In addition, cognitive-behavioral
therapists were more likely to report an intention to try different treatment plans for cases
in which clients were judged to have made no progress or deteriorated. This latter
finding was replicated by Hatfield and Ogles (2006).

Evaluating Clinical Judgment
The primary criterion used to evaluate clinical judgment is validity (based on
Chronbach’s, 1971, discussion of the validation of decisions made on the basis of test
results). In the context of clinical judgment, it is the validity of a set of judgments made
by a clinician that is examined. Decisions are valid if they are reliable, unbiased,
accurate, and ultimately, useful. Validity is often difficult to evaluate in judgment
research because of the need to subjectively select a criterion of accuracy. For example,
Garb (1998) noted that psychological diagnoses are difficult to evaluate because they are
open and arbitrary concepts. The most common methods of studying the validity of
diagnoses include the use of structured interviews, expert judgments based on all
available data (the LEAD procedure; Spitzer, 1983), construct validity studies, latent class
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analysis, and the Robins and Guze (1970) criteria. The latter criteria describe a research
approach to establishing diagnoses as useful entities.
These methods have been applied extensively to examine the validity of clinical
judgments in a variety of contexts. As noted previously, the value of clinical judgment is
often evaluated by comparing decisions based on judgment to decisions based on
actuarial methods. Results of such studies have consistently favored statistical methods.
Meehl’s (1954) seminal work summarized findings from 20 studies which compared the
two methods. Statistical methods were more accurate in all but 1 study, leading Meehl to
conclude that clinicians should leave prognosis and classification to statistical methods.
Although highly controversial (e.g., Holt 1958), Meehl’s conclusions have been generally
accepted. Similar conclusions have been reported in subsequent narrative reviews (e.g.,
Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Faust, 1989; Grove & Meehl, 1996) and meta-analyses
(Grove et al., 2000; Ægisdóttir et al., 2006). Most recently, Ægisdóttir and colleagues
examined 92 effect sizes in which clinical and statistical methods of prediction were
compared. The mean effect size indicated a modest advantage for statistical methods in
terms of judgment validity (Cohen’s d = .12 to .16, depending upon the stringency of
inclusion criteria). Such results underscore the fact that the clinical method of decision
making is subject to biases which are not common to actuarial technique. Specific biases
will be reviewed later. Attention is now turned to the effect of increased clinical
experience on the validity of clinical judgments.
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Experience and the Accuracy of Clinical Judgment
One of the most frequently examined variables in the clinical judgment literature
is therapist experience. The relationship between experience and clinical judgment is
also one of the most hotly-debated subfields of judgment research (Spengler, White,
Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009). Although some studies have supported the
hypothesis that increased experience is related to greater judgment accuracy, most
reviewers of the literature have reached the same conclusion as Wiggins (1973): “There
is little empirical evidence that justifies the granting of ‘expert’ status to the clinician on
the basis of his [or her] training, experience, or information-processing ability” (p. 131).
Howard Garb’s (1998) book, Studying the Clinician, is generally considered the most
comprehensive review of literature related to clinical judgment and experience (Hatfield
& Ogles, 2006; Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009). Garb stated,
“among the most provocative results reported in the area of clinical judgment are those
that indicate that presumed-expert clinicians are no more accurate than other clinicians”
(p. 14), and furthermore that “clinical experience has generally not been related to
validity, both when experienced clinicians have been compared to inexperienced
clinicians and when clinicians have been compared to graduate students” (p. 110).
Similar conclusions have been made so frequently (e.g., Dawes, 1989, 1994; Faust, 1994;
Faust & Ziskin, 1988; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Wedding & Faust, 1989) that Lichtenberg
(1997) surmised, “The fact that counselors’ accuracy of clinical judgment does not
increase with experience is now generally acknowledged” (p. 231).
Although the effects of clinical experience on judgment accuracy appear minimal,
didactic training does appear to increase accuracy. Aronson and Akmatsu (1981)
12

evaluated the validity of 12 graduate students’ judgments of MMPI profiles across
several points in time. Following one year of graduate education in psychology, the
mean validity coefficient for students’ ratings was .20. However, the validity coefficient
increased to .42 following the completion of a course on MMPI interpretation. The
students were assessed again following the completion of a one-year assessment and
therapy practicum; validity coefficients following the practicum were .44, reflecting no
meaningful increase in validity following practicum experience. Garb and Boyle (2003)
reviewed a significant body of literature indicating that both clinicians and graduate
students outperformed lay judges (e.g., undergraduates, secretaries) on a variety of
judgment tasks. However, comparisons between experienced and inexperienced
clinicians generally reveal no differences in accuracy. Similarly, comparisons of
clinicians with graduate students have not typically yielded significant differences
(except in cases in which graduate students were just beginning their training). Garb and
Boyle concluded that clinical judgment increases with didactic training relevant to
judgment tasks, but that increased clinical experience following training is not
consistently related to judgment accuracy.
Despite the common assertion that clinical experience does not correlate with
increased validity of judgment, many authors (and clinicians) have been reluctant to
accept such a conclusion. At an intuitive level, “It just seems right that clinical
experience should beneficially affect clinical judgment and decision making”
(Lichtenberg, 2009, p. 410). Citing research on implicit learning, Westen and
Weinberger (2004) suggested that “clinicians would be a very peculiar species indeed if
they showed no skill development over years of observing and treating psychopathology”
13

(p. 603). That such beliefs are held by many members of the profession of psychology
may be inferred by examining the training model for new clinicians, who are required to
complete a number of hours of practice under the supervision of a more experienced
clinician before reaching eligibility for licensure. Similarly, the 2005 Presidential Task
Force on Evidence-based Practice (Levant, 2005) identified “clinical expertise” as
essential to identifying relevant research, integrating it with clinical data, considering
patient characteristics, and providing services that have the highest probability of positive
outcomes. The Task Force defined clinical expertise as “competence attained by
psychologists through education, training, and experience resulting in effective practice”
(p. 9). Beutler (1995) referred to the standard training model for psychotherapists as
reflecting a “germ theory” of education, in that academic training programs “operate on
the assumption that exposure to psychotherapy, through supervision and class instruction,
over a finite period of time, will result in competence and expertise” (p. 490).
Some researchers have cited related research as potential evidence for positive
effects of experience on clinical judgment. Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman,
Anderson, Cook and colleagues (2009) noted that some indirect evidence for the benefit
of experience has been reported in counseling psychology literature: as compared to
novice counselors, experienced counselors have been found to differ in cognitive
dimensions thought to be related to clinical decision making. For example, experienced
counselors demonstrated broader knowledge structures, better short- and long-term
memory for domain-specific information, greater efficiency of time spent on case
conceptualizations, differing quality of schemata related to case material, and greater
numbers of concepts generated. Advantages in such dimensions seem likely to result in
14

improved clinical judgment and decision making. However, as summarized by the
various reviewers cited above, empirical studies have often failed to demonstrate such an
effect. Garb and Grove (2005) noted that experienced clinicians appear to have some
advantages in terms of generating hypotheses and structuring tasks.
Limitations in Experience-Judgment Research
Given the intuitive and theoretical reasons to believe that clinical judgment
improves with experience, many authors have argued that the lack of consistent empirical
support for such a relationship is a product of methodological deficiencies. Westen and
Weinberger (2004) argued that experience in specific domains (e.g., patient populations,
assessment measures, decision types) increases the validity of decisions in those domains,
but that general clinical experience confers no advantages for domains in which a
clinician has limited experience. However, studies of clinical judgment often require
clinicians to make judgments regarding novel or analogue tasks with which they do not
have previous experience. Holt (1970) noted that research comparing clinical and
statistical prediction ought to utilize the best clinicians only, given that they would be
competing with the best statistical formulae. Similarly, research examining the effects of
experience on clinical judgment should use only clinicians with significant experience
relevant to the task demands as part of the “experienced” sample.
Another methodological limitation in many studies of clinical experience and
judgment is a restricted range of experience among raters. Skovholt, Rønnestad, and
Jennings (1997) noted that the experience difference between “novice” and “experienced”
clinicians is often too small, thereby diluting the effects of experience. This problem has
similarly been noted in reviews of the effects of experience on outcome. Stein and
15

Lambert (1984) found that the average experience level in studies of practitioner
expertise was 2.9 years. Skovholt and colleagues suggested that 10 to 15 years of
experience may be necessary to develop expertise. It is therefore possible that studies
utilizing samples that are more differentiated in terms of experience may produce greater
discrepancies between groups in relation to judgment accuracy. A similar concern is
inconsistency across studies in operationalizing “experience.” Some researchers have
utilized levels of training (e.g., master’s versus doctoral students, graduate students
versus professionals) while others have used continuous measures; even in the case of
continuous measures, the units of measurement (e.g., years, number of clients seen) have
varied. Experience is often measured by single-item measures, which tend to be low in
reliability (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, & Maugherman, 2009). Several other potential
methodological limitations were identified in the context of a recent meta-analysis, which
is now described.
Meta-analysis of Experience and Clinical Judgment
Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, and colleagues (2009) noted that
reviews of the effect of clinician experience on clinical judgment generally take a
narrative approach, which is subject to impressionistic biases. Spengler and colleagues
therefore conducted a meta-analysis in order to examine whether judgments improve with
experience. A thorough search strategy revealed 75 studies which provided sufficient
information to calculate an effect size for clinical or educational experience related to
clinical judgment accuracy by mental health professionals. Judgment types represented
in the analysis included judgments of client problem type or severity, diagnosis,
recommendations for treatment, and prognosis. After eliminating outliers, the mean
16

effect size for the relation of experience and the accuracy of judgments was d = 0.12.
This effect was relatively homogenous in that potential moderator variables (e.g.,
experience type, experience breadth, and study design) were generally non-significant.
However, the benefit of experience on judgment accuracy was more notable for decisions
related to diagnosis and treatment recommendations. Additionally, experienced
clinicians were better than inexperienced clinicians at decision tasks in which a highly
valid criterion of accuracy was not available; this may suggest that experience improves
accuracy when highly nuanced or uncertain decisions are required.
Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al. (2009) concluded that their
results indicated a small but reliable effect for the experience-accuracy relationship.
They suggested that greater clinical or educational experience leads to a 13% increase in
decision accuracy. The relatively small effect size found in the meta-analysis suggests
that the effect of experience on training may be difficult to demonstrate in individual
studies due to limited power. Spengler and colleagues calculated that even an atypically
large study with 200 experienced clinicians and 200 novice clinicians would have a
power of only .22, assuming an effect size of .12 and an alpha of .05, meaning that results
would be statistically significant less than one in four times. Another possibility
suggested by Spengler and colleagues is that research examining the relationship between
experience and judgment accuracy may suffer due to contesting mediators. For example,
experienced clinicians may be more likely to seek feedback, a potential mediator of a
positive experience-accuracy relationship, but may also be more likely to engage in
confirmatory hypothesis testing, which would be negatively related to judgment accuracy.
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Such complex relationships may be examined by a shift toward path and mediation
approaches to examining the relationship between experience and accuracy.
A significant limitation in the studies reviewed by Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir,
Maugherman, et al. (2009) was that objective feedback was provided to raters in only
two of the studies. Therefore, although feedback is frequently suggested to be an
important means of improving judgment accuracy, it remains understudied. The
influence of feedback on the accuracy of clinical judgment is a focus of this paper.
Feedback is therefore discussed in more detail later. Attention is now turned to factors
that influence the decision-making process in clinical judgment tasks.

Factors Affecting Clinical Judgment
Several features of human decision-making and cognitive processes have been
identified as factors which make it difficult for clinicians to learn from experience.
Dawes (1994) asserted, “there are good logical and empirical reasons why experience
does not help in this context, even though we may all ‘learn from experience’ in other
contexts” (p. 106). The “other contexts” referred to by Dawes include motor tasks such
as riding a bicycle, driving a car, or even performing surgery. Such tasks are
characterized by immediate feedback regarding success or failure. Additionally, they
cannot be taught solely through verbal instruction, but rather require repetitive experience
in order to achieve mastery. In contrast, clinical judgment tasks do not yield immediate
physical feedback and involve more cognitive processes. They are therefore subject to
cognitive biases and errors. Some of the most common “cognitive errors” related to
clinical judgment are reviewed in this section.
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Anchoring and Adjustment
Clinical judgment and subsequent decision-making is heavily influenced by the
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, originally described by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974): “people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield
the final answer” (p. 1128). Anchoring leads to errors in decision making because
anchors are often based on insufficient or arbitrary information. Houts and Galante (1985)
found that clinicians formed impressions of videotaped clients quickly, and that their
final decisions regarding client status was influenced by those first impressions.
Gambrill (2005) noted that clinicians “tend to believe in initial judgments, even when we
are aware that the knowledge we have access to has been arbitrarily selected” (p. 232).
The anchoring heuristic influences decisions at each stage of therapy. For
example, clinicians may overvalue information gained during the intake process and
ignore additional, or even contrary, information revealed during the course of therapy
(Turk, Salovey, & Prentice, 1988). It is also likely that anchoring occurs within
individual sessions. For example, a client who states early in a therapy session that
things have been “really good” may be rated by the clinician as improved from the
previous session even if the client reports increased difficulties during the remainder of
the hour.
Bias resulting from the anchoring heuristic is compounded by the fact that once
new information is attained, corresponding adjustments are generally insufficient. Epley
and Gilovich (2006) found that adjustments away from previous anchors tend to
terminate once plausible values are reached. Various studies have found that the order in
which information is presented influences clinicians’ final ratings, even when all
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clinicians received identical information by the time they made the ratings (Garb, 1998).
For example, Pain and Sharpley (1989) presented “good,” “bad,” and “neutral” written
information about hypothetical clients to clinicians in differing orders and subsequently
asked them to rate the clients’ global functioning. They found that when negative
information was presented first it overshadowed good information presented later.
Confirmatory Bias
A related consideration is the confirmatory bias, the tendency to seek and
overweigh evidence that supports our beliefs and to ignore and underweigh contradictory
evidence (Gambrill, 2005). Confirmatory bias is an error of both memory processes as
well as behavioral strategies. For example, after making a diagnosis, a clinician may
selectively remember information that supports the judgment. Furthermore, the clinician
may engage in assessment strategies that are more likely to confirm than to disconfirm
the original judgment, a tendency known as confirmatory hypothesis testing. A dramatic
example of confirmatory bias is Temerlin’s (1968) study. An actor was commissioned to
portray on videotape a happy and self-confident with no ostensible signs of
maladjustment or distress. In the first condition, raters (psychologists and psychiatrists)
had access to a senior clinician’s suggestion that the man was a “healthy individual.”
Raters in this condition uniformly agreed that the man on the tape was, in fact, healthy.
In a second condition, the senior clinician’s suggestion was that the man appeared
neurotic but was actually psychotic. Following viewing of the tape, only 6% of raters in
the second condition considered that man to be healthy.
Strohmer, Shivy, and Chiodo (1990) gave three versions of a case history to
master’s degree counselors. One version of the history contained an equal number of
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phrases describing good self-control and phrases describing a lack of self-control. The
other two case histories included either more phrases denoting good self-control or more
phrases indicating a lack of self-control. One week later, counselors working with the
hypothesis that the client lacked self-control remembered more information that was
consistent with this hypothesis, even when a greater number of contradictory statements
had been made.
Pfeiffer, Whelan, and Martin (2000) examined the hypothesis-testing strategies of
72 psychology doctoral students. Participants were given a referral from a physician for
a mock client who they would later view on videotape in an initial psychotherapy session.
Referrals provided either a highly-plausible preliminary diagnosis (i.e., one that was
consistent with content of the videotape), a low-plausibility diagnosis (i.e., largely
inconsistent with the content of the videotape), or did not include a diagnosis. After
reading the referral and viewing the videotape, students reported their preliminary
hypotheses (diagnoses). They were then asked to recall nonverbal cues that they had
attended to during the videotape and to provide 5 questions that they would ask the client
if they were to continue with the client in psychotherapy. Participants who had received
a highly-plausible initial hypothesis (diagnosis) and therapists who formulated their own
hypotheses independently were more likely than those in the low-plausibility condition to
utilize confirmatory strategies in their attending to cues as well as their follow-up
questions.
Similarly, Owen (2008) asked 97 mental health counselors-in-training to review a
hypothetical case study and to report their preliminary diagnostic impressions.
Counselors were then asked to generate questions they would use in continued
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assessment of the client. As hypothesized, counselors generated more confirmatory than
disconfirmatory questions. Additionally, questions that were confirmatory tended to have
more diagnostic clarity and more specificity than disconfirmatory questions, leading
Owen to suggest that the counselors were better at developing questions that were likely
to confirm their initial hypotheses. In the context of judging client progress during the
course of therapy, it seems likely that clinicians who form the initial impression during a
session that a client has improved will pursue topics related to client improvement; in
contrast, the early impression that a client is worse-off may lead the clinician to ask about
current difficulties in the client’s life. These strategies would elicit information
consistent with preliminary hypotheses, which may lead clinicians to gain an inaccurate
view of client status and progress.
Hindsight Bias
Hindsight bias refers to “the tendency to believe, once the outcome is known, that
the outcome could have been predicted more easily than is actually the case” (Wedding &
Faust, 1989, p. 237). Knowledge of an outcome encourages the view that it was
inevitable (Gambrill, 2005). Furthermore, when individuals engage in hindsight bias they
tend to assume a direct relationship between the observed outcome and events or
conditions prior to the outcome; explanations of an observed event are often therefore too
deterministic. Hindsight bias is similar to confirmatory bias in that it leads to the
overweighing of information that is consistent with the outcome.
Garb (1989) noted that a deterministic outlook can obstruct clinicians from
learning by experience. For example, if clinicians construct deterministic explanations
each time they receive feedback about a client, they will create incomplete explanations
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given that they do not have all relevant information. Additionally, feedback may be
influenced by measurement error, thereby causing clinicians to draw incorrect inferences.
Dawes (1989, 1994) suggested that although biases in recall make it difficult for
clinicians to learn from experience, they may also create an illusory correlation in which
clinicians believe that the quality of their judgments increases with experience. For
example, a clinician who notices that many of his depressed clients reported unhappy
childhood memories may make deterministic assumptions about the influence of unhappy
childhood events. He may therefore feel more confident in diagnosing future clients who
report such events as depressed on the basis of his clinical experience. However, doing
so would overlook the fact that many individuals with unpleasant childhood memories
are not depressed.
Availability Heuristic
Confirmatory and hindsight biases are related to the availability heuristic, which
occurs when clinicians are influenced by the ease with which instances or occurrences
can be remembered (Garb, 1998). The ease of remembering instances varies depending
upon factors such as retrievability, vividness of the instance, and the strength of
association between two events. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted that the
availability heuristic can account for illusory-correlation effects because when the
cognitive association between two events is strong, one is likely to conclude that the
events have been frequently paired. In the example in the previous paragraph, the
availability of instances in which depression was paired with unhappy childhood
memories may lead the clinician to perceive an illusory correlation between the two
events. Additionally, the clinician is drawing only from an available sample of
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individuals with depression, which is not representative of all individuals who had
unhappy childhood experiences.
Biases Based on Client Characteristics
In addition to general cognitive biases, clinicians’ decisions may be influenced by
characteristics of clients themselves. Garb (1998) reviewed extant research regarding the
extent to which clinical judgment is affected but various specific factors, only a few of
which are summarized here. Garb concluded that client race was not generally associated
with treatment decisions or with ratings of psychiatric symptoms and personality traits.
However, some results suggested that White clinicians may be more prone than Asian
American clinicians to describe Asian American clients as depressed or withdrawn (LiRepac, 1980; Tseng, McDermot, Ogino, & Ebata, 1982). Garb reported some evidence
for social class bias related to both personality assessment and treatment decisions. In
cases in which bias was found, results most often indicated that lower class clients were
rated more negatively than middle-class clients. Regarding treatment, lower class clients
were less likely to receive psychotherapy than middle-class clients and were judged to be
less likely to benefit from therapy. Lower class clients were also more likely to receive
supportive, rather than insight-oriented, therapy.
Lichtenberg (1997) noted that clinicians share some of the same sex-role and sexnorm biases as society as a whole; such biases are likely to influence clinical decision
making. Rosenfield (1982) examined archival data for admissions to a psychiatric
hospital and found that for individuals diagnosed with personalities and substance-use
disorders (considered to be associated with being male), 50% of females were
hospitalized but only 18% of males. In contrast, among individuals diagnosed with
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neurosis or depression (more often diagnosed in females), 66% of men and only 43% of
women were hospitalized. Referrals for type of therapy may also be influenced by client
gender. Two studies (Bowman, 1982; Fernbach, Winstead, & Derlega, 1989) indicated
that men may be more likely to be recommended for couple therapy and group therapy,
while women may be more likely to be referred for individual insight-oriented therapy.
Awareness of Cognitive Processes
The application of clinical judgment requires the clinician to carefully examine all
available information and to assign relative weighting to the various sources in order to
reach a decision. This type of complex integration of data, also referred to as configural
analysis, is difficult to manage. Faust and Ziskin (1988) suggested that although
clinicians believe that their decisions rest on a careful weighing of many variables,
evidence suggests that only a few variables (two or three) make a significant impact in
such decisions. Awareness of potential sources of bias and error is therefore an important
factor in making these complex decisions. However, research indicates that clinicians
frequently may be unaware of how they make judgments (Garb, 1998).
Rock (1994) surveyed 106 mental health professionals (mostly doctoral-level
psychologists) in order to elicit their attitudes and knowledge regarding clinical judgment
research. Although respondents largely agreed that judgment research was important and
that it had meaningful applications for clinical practice, they reported a low level of
personal familiarity with judgment literature. The average respondent had not read any
of the (then) most significant books or articles on clinical judgment. It is therefore
apparent that limited awareness of one’s own internal processes, as well as limited
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knowledge of cognitive biases in general, may further limit the ability to make complex
judgments.

Confidence
An important factor related to clinical judgment is confidence. Decisions are
based in part on the degree to which the decision-maker is confident that a chosen course
of action will lead to a desired outcome (Stankov, Lee, & Paek, 2009). A large body of
research suggests that individuals tend to be overconfident regarding the accuracy of their
beliefs. This effect has been noted to have a wide effect in various financial, political,
legal, and clinical contexts. Plous (1993) suggested that “no problem in judgment and
decision making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than overconfidence”
(p. 217). Awareness of the limitations of one’s judgments is especially important for
mental health practitioners, who are called upon to make important decisions in treatment,
assessment, and forensic settings. In the context of assessing client progress from week
to week, a clinician’s overconfidence that a client has improved could lead to the
premature termination of therapy that would still be beneficial. It could also deter the
clinician from pursuing changes to the treatment plan in cases in which the client is
experiencing little benefit. Additionally, clinicians who become overconfident fail to
seek information that would allow them to revise their judgments (Einhorn, 1980).
Are Clinicians Overconfident?
Garb (1986, 1998) reviewed the accuracy (“appropriateness”) of confidence
ratings made by clinicians in clinical judgment studies. The majority of studies in this
area have examined clinicians’ confidence in their diagnoses. Garb concluded that
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confidence often (but inconsistently) exhibits a weak positive relationship with the
validity of judgments. Although validity and confidence are positively related in general,
research has demonstrated that clinicians may frequently be overconfident. For example,
Gaudette (1992) found neuropsychologists to be accurate on 62% of diagnoses related to
potential cerebral impairment; neuropsychologists in the study had estimated their hit rate
to be 77.5%. Arkes (1981) noted that the most confident clinicians tend to be the least
accurate.
It should be noted that a positive overall correlation between confidence and
validity does not ensure that raters are well calibrated. A judge is well calibrated if, over
the long run, for all judgments assigned the same probability of being accurate, the
proportion accurate is equal to the probability assigned (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1977).
Therefore, if judgments are correct half of the time that a clinician rates his or her
likelihood of being correct as .5, the clinician is well calibrated. Calibration, a common
measure of the appropriateness of confidence ratings, is therefore not strictly a measure
of the correlation between individual confidence estimates and the accuracy of related
judgments.
Experience and Confidence
As opposed to the relationship between clinical experience and the validity of
judgments, the relationship between clinician experience and the appropriateness of
confidence ratings is generally established to be positive, albeit weakly. Garb (1986)
summarized that experienced clinicians tend to make more appropriate confidence ratings
than inexperienced clinicians as long as the information used to make decisions is valid.
The relatively increased accuracy of confidence ratings by experienced clinicians has
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been observed in judgments based on neuropsychological data, biographical data,
objective personality measure data, and information observed in psychotherapy sessions.
These findings are interesting given that research in other fields has indicated that experts,
as compared to non-experts, are as likely or more likely to be overconfident (e.g.,
Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1977; Mahajan, 1992; McKenzie, Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008). The
reasons for the apparent benefit of experience are unclear. It is possible that clinicians
gain appreciation for the complexity of decisions with experience. However, such a
possibility is somewhat contrary to research regarding the effect of cognitive biases over
time.
The Influence of Additional Information on Confidence
Oskamp (1965) examined overconfidence in judges consisting of graduate and
undergraduate students as well as psychologists. Judges were given a case study and
asked to answer multiple-choice questions about the case based on the information
provided. They also indicated their level of confidence in each answer. After the first
round of questions, the judges were provided with additional information regarding the
case and were administered the same questions, with confidence ratings. This procedure
was repeated across four stages. Oskamp found that clinicians’ confidence increased at
each stage as they received additional data. However, accuracy did not significantly
increase from the first to the last stage. These results suggest that clinicians may become
increasingly confident with more information. It is noteworthy that the additional
information given at each round was consistent with previous information and added little
new details.
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Trueblood and Binder (1997) provided neuropsychological testing data to a
sample of neuropsychologists and asked them to make diagnostic judgments. Some of
the neuropsychologists were given results from forced-choice tests used to detect
malingering. Judges who arrived at a diagnosis of malingering and who received the
forced-choice test data were significantly more confident in their diagnoses than those
who diagnosed malingering but without the use of such data.
In contrast to Oskamp’s (1965) and Trueblood and Binder’s (1997) results,
Peterson and Pitz (1986) found that individuals demonstrated less overconfidence in
decisions as the amount of information available increased. The decrease in
overconfidence appeared to occur because as increased amounts of information were
available, the accuracy of predictions increased while certainty about the precision of
judgments decreased. Based on these results, Hatfield (2007) suggested that additional
information may only increase confidence when it is consistent with previous information.
Hatfield mailed brief paragraphs about the treatment progress of a hypothetical client to a
large number of practicing psychologists. Among the paragraphs, the availability of
information derived from client verbal reports and from outcome measures was
systematically varied. Additionally, the content of verbal reports and outcome measure
reports was varied to indicate progress or a lack of progress. After reviewing the
information, clinicians indicated their treatment recommendations and rated their
confidence about the accuracy of those decisions. Hatfield hypothesized that therapists
who had access to outcome data and client verbal reports that were consistent would be
more confident than those who had access to only one data source, but that therapists
would be less confident in their estimations of client progress in cases of contradiction
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between verbal reports and outcome data. However, no systematic differences in
confidence were found among levels of the amount of information available to therapists.
The effects of the amount of information available on confidence in clinical judgments
remain unclear.

Improving Clinical Judgment
The judgment literature reviewed above indicates that clinical judgment is valid
and reliable at times but is also vulnerable to a variety of errors due to its subjective and
informal method of data integration. Decisions based on clinical judgment have
generally been less valid than decisions made through the use of statistical algorithms.
Additionally, clinical judgment appears to improve only marginally with increasing
clinical experience. Given these conclusions, various researchers have suggested that it is
essential to move beyond general examinations of the accuracy of judgment. Subsequent
steps in judgment research include identifying conditions under which clinical judgment
is optimized, developing a comprehensive theory of clinical judgment (e.g., Ridley &
Shaw-Ridely, 2009), and developing methods of improving clinical judgment. Garb
(1998) asserted that “improving the accuracy of judgments is the ultimate goal of
judgment research” (p. 3). Although the general effect of training is small, individual
clinicians appear to vary significantly in the accuracy of their judgments. For example,
Haderlie and Kern (2009) found that the correlations between therapists’ estimates of
client change and an objective change measure varied from -.18 to .31. It is therefore
important to consider methods of improving the judgment abilities of individual
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therapists. An increasing amount of literature has therefore been devoted to suggesting
means of increasing judgment accuracy. Some of these are now reviewed.
Judgment Task Considerations
The accuracy of clinical judgment is dependent upon the nature of the decision to
be made. Some decisions, such as the prediction of violence or suicide, are extremely
difficult (Garb, 1998). Such tasks may not be appropriate targets for clinical judgment,
given that standardized decision algorithms tend to be much more accurate. Garb
suggested that making ratings for difficult tasks may be not only dangerous, but unethical.
Gambrill (2005) noted that judgment may at times be more difficult due to situational
factors such as time pressures, limited resources, and conflicting goals. Such context
factors should be attended to and addressed to the extent possible.
Another consideration related to judgment tasks is the data sources available.
Several authors (e.g., Bell & Mellor, 2009; Garb, 1986) have noted that, like any
assessment procedure, the validity of decisions based on clinical judgment is restricted by
the reliability and validity of the information obtained. This observation is supported by
the fact that results of judgment studies have been significantly more favorable when
decisions were based on objective, as compared to projective, personality data.
Furthermore, clinical judgment may vary based on the way in which clinical observations
are aggregated. Westen and Weinberger (2004) suggested that clinical judgment may be
most valid when it is used to rate and code (quantify) various sources of information,
with these ratings then aggregated through more formal, statistical, procedures.
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Suggestions for Clinicians
Clinicians may improve the validity of their judgments through careful attention
to elements of a scientist-practitioner approach (Bell & Mellor, 2009; Spengler, White,
Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009). For example, clinicians should attend to
empirical research in order to select validated approaches to assessment and treatment.
Garb (1998) suggested that when sound empirical research has been conducted, clinicians
should weight it more heavily than their own clinical experience. Additionally, various
authors have noted that clinicians should gain familiarity with literature regarding
decision-making theories, social cognition, and cognitive biases (e.g., Nisbett & Ross,
1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
In addition to increasing their familiarity with relevant literature, clinicians may
improve their clinical judgment by incorporating debiasing strategies into their decision
making (Arkes, 1981). The most frequently-suggested strategy is to consider alternatives
prior to making a decision. For example, a clinician who believes a client is depressed
should consider alternative diagnoses and seek disconfirmatory evidence. Similarly,
clinicians should consider client strengths in addition to deficits in order to form a more
valid view of the client (Garb, 1998). Specific instruction to consider alternative
explanations has been found to significantly reduce hindsight bias (Arkes, Faust,
Gulmette, & Hart, 1988; Tutin, 1993). Hindsight bias may also be reduced by decreasing
reliance on memory. Arkes noted that observations that are not recorded accurately and
in detail at the time they are made can often be ignored due to hindsight bias. In other
words, a clinician’s beliefs influence the information that is remembered unless it is
documented.
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Training Considerations
The limited effects of experience on the validity of clinical judgments point to the
essential role played by training in developing clinical judgment abilities. Didactic
training may be especially useful in increasing the validity of clinical judgment in
psychology, given that training effects have been significantly greater than experience
effects on judgment accuracy. The suggestions noted above for clinicians may also be
incorporated into training within graduate programs. In addition to skills necessary to
make accurate judgments in certain tasks (e.g., interpretation of an MMPI profile),
training programs should focus on the development of generalizable skills and attitude
that will enhance clinical judgment among their graduates. Although introducing
students to judgment research is an important component, Arkes (1981) noted that simply
describing cognitive biases and encouraging individuals not to be influenced by them is
not effective. Garb (1998) suggested that graduate programs might increase the accuracy
of diagnostic decisions by training students to use instruments that are highly valid for
that purpose, such as semistructured and structured interviews.
Spengler, Strohmer, Dixon, and Shivy (1995) developed a scientist-practitioner
model of psychological assessment that was designed to reduce errors in judgment. Their
model involves ongoing observation, inference, and hypothesis testing, which are utilized
to develop a tentative and fluid conceptualization of the client. The model also focuses
on developing scientific attitudes such as openness, self-awareness, and curiosity.
Competing hypotheses are tested through multiple methods. Finally, Spengler and
colleagues’ model provides mnemonics designed to promote debiasing activites. These
include the following: 1) consider probability and base rate data, 2) combine actuarial and
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clinical prediction techniques, 3) delay judgments, 4) reduce overconfidence in one
interpretation of the data, and 5) invoke a cognitively complex approach to data
interpretation. Preliminary evidence suggests that such didactic techniques may increase
students’ confidence and abilities related to case conceptualizations and assessment
(Meier, 1999).
In addition to increasing judgment accuracy, another potential goal for training
programs regarding clinical judgment is to reduce overconfidence. Smith and Agate
(2004) developed a 90-minute instructional module for trainees in a counseling program.
Trainees were assigned to treatment and control groups. Those in the treatment group
completed the instructional module in small group settings. The module included a
hands-on judgment task, group discussion of the process by which decisions were made,
and didactic instruction regarding cognitive heuristics. Although all trainees
demonstrated overconfidence at pretest and posttest, confidence scores were found to
decrease in the treatment group.
Decision-making Aids
Various aids are available to clinicians in making decisions. Specific aids depend
upon the nature of the judgment task. An important consideration across judgment tasks
is the consideration of base rates. Base rate information, such as that applied to statistical
algorithms, can greatly enhance the validity of judgments. Arkes (1981) provided an
instructive example: If the probability of a rare condition (e.g., “multiple personality”) is
1 out of 100,000 in the general population, the base rate for the condition is .00001.
Suppose a remarkably accurate test for the condition were available, such that a “positive”
result for the test occurred 100 times more frequently in individuals with multiple
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personality disorder than it did among individuals without the condition. A positive test
therefore results in a likelihood ratio of 100/1, which would lead most clinicians to
assume that a positive test almost proves the presence of multiple personality. However,
in order to compute the true probability that a positive test is associated with multiple
personality disorder for an individual in the general population, the likelihood ratio must
be multiplied by the base rate (100 x .00001), resulting in a probability of only .1% even
given a positive test result. The consideration of base rates therefore becomes
increasingly important when base rates are extreme.
Similarly, clinicians should utilize statistical algorithms to the extent available.
Local norms may be developed in order to establish base rates that are most valid in a
given setting. Such activity is exemplary of the local clinical scientist model (Stricker,
2002). Clinicians should utilize decision aids such as diagnostic criteria, which improve
interrater reliability and reduce the effects of bias (Garb, 1998). The application of many
statistical decision aids has become more feasible across a variety of settings with
advances in computers and statistical software.
Feedback
Reviewers of clinical judgment literature have almost universally emphasized the
importance of feedback regarding decision accuracy. Meehl (1954) noted that if
clinicians do not receive feedback about their decisions, the validity of judgment cannot
be improved. This sentiment has been repeatedly echoed in more recent literature (e.g.,
Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Garb & Boyle, 2003; Lichtenberg, 1997; Spengler, White,
Ægisdóttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009). Garb (1998) suggested that “one reason why it
can be difficult for mental health professionals to learn from their experiences is that they
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do not receive feedback for some tasks” (p. 201). Dawes (1994) described a terminal
insight model to suggest the central nature of feedback to true learning: individuals
making categorical judgments will utilize a specific sorting rule until they are told that
they are incorrect. They then abandon the original rule and try out another, until they
identify the correct sorting rule and “stick with it.” Dawes noted that “the terminal insight
explanation implies that subjects will try new ways of sorting by distinguishing
characteristics only after they receive feedback that they have made an error” (p. 114,
italics in the original).
Despite the central importance afforded feedback in literature regarding the
enhancement of clinical judgment, feedback in this context has been remarkably
understudied. Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir, and Maugherman (2009) described the
results of their literature review using the terms clinical judgment and feedback: “We
found only a limited number of examples where feedback had been investigated in
mental health decision making (we found several examples in medical decision making)”
(p. 419). Spengler and colleagues concluded that “systematic research is sorely needed
on methods and types of feedback” (p. 419). Given that it is a primary focus of the
current research, the topic of feedback is now described in more detail.

Feedback on Clinical Judgment
The study of feedback originated in the fields of cybernetics and engineering and
was adopted to the study of human behavior in the mid-20th century (Claiborn &
Goodyear, 2005). In the context of psychology, feedback is defined as information that is
provided to a person, from an external source, about that person’s behavior or its effects
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(Claiborn, Goodyear, & Horner, 2001). Although feedback is inherent in all human
interaction, research on feedback has focused on that feedback which is deliberately
provided with a certain objective, generally to improve performance in the behavior for
which feedback is provided. Such deliberate feedback has been termed feedback
intervention (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Deliberate feedback may be purely descriptive,
involving a description of behavior with limited inference about implications of the
behavior (Claiborn & Goodyear, 2005). However, in the context of enhancing clinical
judgment, feedback is necessary evaluative. Evaluative feedback offers an assessment of
behavior (in this case the decision made) in relation to some criterion (the validity of the
decision). Feedback may be indirectly evaluative when it is provided regarding judgment
tasks. For example, a clinician may estimate that a client has made progress during the
course of therapy and then receive feedback indicating that the client has, in fact,
deteriorated. In this case, feedback does not directly evaluate the clinician’s judgment
but nevertheless provides correction because it is compared by the clinician to his or her
previous judgment.
Historically, it was widely assumed that the provision of feedback always results
in improved performance. Latham and Locke (1991) noted that “few concepts in
psychology have been written about more uncritically and incorrectly than that of
feedback” (p. 224). However, researchers in the past thirty years have recognized that
feedback interventions produce variable results. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) conducted a
meta-analysis of data from 131 feedback studies, which included 607 effect sizes and
reflected the data of more than 12,000 participants who received evaluative feedback for
a variety of tasks. They found that over one third of the individual effect sizes were
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negative (i.e., indicated that feedback had resulted in a deterioration of performance).
Therefore, although the overall effects of feedback were positive and reflected a medium
effect (d = .41) on performance, individual effects are not uniformly positive.
The effectiveness of feedback is strongly influenced by the context and manner in
which feedback is delivered. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found that the effectiveness of
feedback interventions were augmented by increased frequency of feedback. Frequent,
continuous provision of feedback allows the receiver to monitor the value of alterations
and to continually refine the rules used to make decisions. Similarly, feedback is most
effective when it is delivered as quickly as possible in relation to the judgment for which
feedback is given. Feedback is also influenced by the validity of the criteria against
which judgments are compared. Therefore, it is crucial that measures used to evaluate
the validity of judgments be sensitive and valid themselves (Gambrill, 2005).
Effects of Feedback on the Validity of Judgments
As noted above, very little research has systematically examined the effects of
feedback on the validity of clinical judgments. Goldberg and Rorer (1965, cited in
Goldberg, 1968) studied the effects of training with feedback on judges’ abilities to make
valid differential diagnoses between neurosis and psychosis on the basis MMPI profiles.
Their sample included 3 experienced psychologists, 10 graduate students in psychology,
and 10 “naïve” participants (non-psychologists with no prior training in the MMPI). All
participants engaged in extensive training in which they examined a profile, made a
diagnosis, and turned the profile over to see the criterion diagnosis. Over 300 profiles
were used, multiple times each. By the conclusion of the training period, judges had
received feedback for the profiles more than 4,000 times each. All groups demonstrated
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increased validity on the training profiles. However, on testing profiles (those not
included in the training), Goldberg reported an increase in judgmental accuracy from 52%
to approximately 58% for naïve judges; psychologists and graduate students
demonstrated 65% accuracy at the beginning of training and did not experience gains
following 17 weeks of training. Training therefore did not generalize beyond the sample
of training profiles.
Graham (1971) conducted one of the only clinical judgment studies in which the
availability of feedback was systematically varied. As in Goldberg (1968), the judgment
task was to identify a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathway &
McKinley, 1943) profile as neurotic or psychotic. Participants included 21 clinical
psychologists, 21 graduate students in clinical psychology who had completed
coursework involving the MMPI, and 21 undergraduate students with no prior MMPI
experience. Each participant made diagnoses for profiles in blocks of 10, with neurotic
and psychotic profiles evenly divided in each block. Participants in one condition simply
made diagnoses and received no feedback. Participants in the other two conditions
turned profiles over following diagnosis in order to receive feedback; judges in one of the
conditions received correct feedback, while those in the second feedback condition
received random feedback (which was accurate only 67% of the time). Hit rates for PhD
psychologists were 72% when they received correct feedback, 57% when they received
random feedback, and 52% (just better than chance!) when receiving no feedback.
Graduate student hit rates were 61% when receiving correct feedback and 58% in the
other two conditions. Finally, undergraduates achieved a hit rate of 57% when receiving
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correct feedback, 55% with random feedback, and 50% with no feedback. Receiving
correct feedback therefore led to increases in judgment accuracy for each group.
The Nature of Feedback Regarding Client Progress
Therapists receive nearly constant feedback regarding their clients’ progress in
therapy. Client verbal reports (e.g., “I don’t think what we’re doing is helping me”) and
behaviors in session provide continuous data which may be integrated by the clinician to
make judgments regarding client progress. Westen and Weinberger (2004) suggested
that “psychotherapists tend to have much more direct and immediate feedback than most
other medical practitioners, who may prescribe a medication or perform a procedure and
not see the patient again for a year” (p. 603). However, feedback such as client verbal
reports and behavioral observations are highly prone to a variety of biases on the part of
both the clinician and the client. Garb and Grove (2005) argued that psychologists
generally do not receive the same type of highly valid feedback that physicians, for
example, receive through laboratory tests. Garb and Grove dismissed the type of verbal
report feedback described by Westen and Weinberger by suggesting that “astrologists
weigh the same types of feedback when they decide whether their interpretations are
correct” (p. 658). Feedback such as client verbal reports is subject to socially desirable
responding; many clients are likely hesitant to verbalize feelings that they are not
progressing for fear of either hurting the therapist’s feelings or personal discomfort
discussing the topic. Furthermore, clinicians’ interpretations of client reports may be
biased due to processes such as confirmatory bias. Finally, feedback received regarding
client progress may be misleading due to sampling bias, if clients who are not
experiencing progress drop out of therapy (Garb, 1998).
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Outcome Measures as a Source of Feedback
Due to the limited nature of standard sources of feedback regarding client
progress in psychotherapy, researchers have increasingly sought to apply more
standardized methods to the evaluation of client change throughout treatment. A
particularly promising development is the use of outcome measures to monitor change at
frequent intervals throughout therapy, rather than simply as pre- and post-treatment
assessments. Although psychotherapists traditionally resisted the use of outcome
measures in clinical practice (Gilbody, House, & Sheldon, 2002), they are quickly
becoming more widely used. Hatfield and Ogles (2004) found that 37% of practitioners
responding to their survey used outcome measures in some form or another. This number
represented an increase as compared to similar surveys only a few years prior, in which
the proportions of clinicians employing outcome measures were 29% (Phelps, Eisman, &
Kohout, 1998) and 23% (Bickman et al., 2000). Outcome measure usage is even more
common at psychology department training clinics (56%; Tyler, 2002) and internship
training sites (47%; Mours, Campbell, Gathercoal, & Peterson, 2009), suggesting that the
proportion of clinicians using such techniques will continue to grow. The increased use
of outcome measures in therapy has developed from factors both within the field of
psychology (e.g., advances in research data and methodologies) and outside of it (e.g., the
requirements of many agencies and managed health care companies that clinicians
provide evidence of treatment effectiveness).
The use of outcome measures as a means of monitoring client change over the
course of therapy and providing feedback to therapists is one of the most significant
recent trends in psychotherapy research and practice. Various systems of outcome
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measurement have been developed within the last ten years (e.g., Kordy, Hannover, &
Richard, 2001; Lueger et al., 2001; Miller, Duncan, Sorrell, & Brown, 2005; reviewed in
Beutler, 2001). Much of the rapid increase in the usage of such techniques is due to
evidence that providing clinicians with feedback from outcome measures may result in
enhanced outcomes for their clients, especially in cases where clients are not progressing
in treatment. For example, Brodey, Cuffel, McCulloch, Tani, Maruish, Brody, and
Unutzer (2005) randomly assigned 1374 clients in a managed behavioral healthcare
system to feedback or control conditions. All patients completed 11 items from the
Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1983) at intake and again 6 weeks later.
Feedback regarding the results was only provided to therapists of patients in the feedback
condition. The clients whose clinicians received feedback from their SCL-90 showed
significantly greater improvement in total symptoms than clients whose clinicians did not
receive feedback. Such a result is impressive given the minimal nature of the feedback
data and the small number of administrations.
The use of outcome measures as a means of client monitoring and obtaining
feedback also appears to have benefits in terms of the efficient use of community and
professional resources. Slade, McCrone, Kuipers, Leese, Cahill, Parabiaghi, and
colleagues (2006) administered monthly outcome and alliance measures to therapists and
clients at a community outpatient clinic in London. Results of the measures were
provided to a randomized half of therapists and clients. Slade and colleagues observed
that clients in the feedback group averaged significantly fewer days as psychiatric
inpatients over the course of the study (3.5 as compared to 16.4 in the control group).
They concluded that the reduced inpatient care usage made the feedback a cost-effective
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intervention. Similarly, Percevic (2002; cited in Percevic, Lambert, & Kordy, 2004)
provided feedback to therapists of a randomly-selected group of clients, while providing
no feedback on other clients. Clients in the feedback condition demonstrated reductions
in their mean length of therapy before discharge at a clinically significant improved
condition (46 days as compared to 57 days without feedback), suggesting that the
provision of feedback may have fostered more rapid improvement during the course of
treatment.
Although the effectiveness of outcome feedback as a means of enhancing
outcomes has been well demonstrated, little is known regarding the mechanisms that lead
to such improvements (Newnham & Page, 2007). One possibility is that receiving
actuarial feedback regarding client outcomes may improve clinicians’ judgments about
treatment effectiveness when clients are not making gains (Spengler, White, Ægisdóttir,
& Maugherman, 2009). This possibility will be examined in the current research
utilizing the Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45; Lambert et al., 2004). The OQ-45 and
its associated feedback system, as well as relevant research results, are therefore reviewed
in more detail.

The Outcome Questionnaire-45
The OQ-45 (Lambert et al., 2004) is a 45-item self-report questionnaire that
measures general psychological distress and dysfunction. Originally developed in 1996
(Lambert et al., 1996), the OQ-45 has rapidly increased in popularity among clinicians
and researchers. Recent surveys indicate that it is commonly administered at
approximately 18% of psychology internship sites (Mours, Campbell, Gathercoal, &
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Peterson, 2009) and 20% of psychology training clinics (Tyler, 2002). Administration of
the OQ-45 requires approximately 5 minutes. Patients rate each of the items (e.g., “I feel
hopeless about the future”) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (never true) to 4
(almost always), in regard to the prior week. The 45 items yield a Total Score ranging
from 0 to 180, with higher scores indicating poorer functioning. The OQ-45 also
includes three subscales, which are based on Lambert’s (1983) conceptualization of
psychotherapeutic progress as consisting of three domains of interest: 1) subjective
discomfort, 2) the quality of interpersonal relationships, and 3) social role performance.
However, examinations of the factor structure of the OQ-45 have provided limited
support for a three-factor model (de Jong et al., 2007; Mueller, Lambert, & Burlingame,
1998). Umphress, Lambert, Smart, Barlow, and Clouse (1997) found high
intercorrelations among the subscales, suggesting that they may represent variance of a
single factor. A recent examination of the factor structure of an Italian translation of the
OQ-45 (Lo Coco, Chiappelli, Bensi, Gullo, Prestan, & Lambert, 2008) found support for
a bi-level solution with one general factor and three second-order factors (representing
the three OQ-45 subscales).
Psychometric Properties
Test-retest reliability for the OQ-45 is adequate (.84 for the Total Score, .78 to .82
for the subscales) and decreases with increasing time intervals (Lambert et al., 1996).
Internal consistency estimates are good, ranging from .90 to .93 for the Total Score
(Lambert et al., 1996; Vermeersch et al., 2004). Umphress, Lambert, Smart, Barlow, and
Clouse (1997) examined the construct and criterion validity of the OQ-45 by comparing
OQ-45 scores among individuals with various diagnoses. They found that psychiatric
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patients scored higher on the Total Score and Symptom Distress scale than did nonpatient
samples. Among patient samples, those with Axis I diagnoses received higher scores
than those with V-code diagnoses, suggesting that higher scores are indeed associated
with greater distress and dysfunction. Umphress and colleagues also reported
correlations between the OQ-45 and a variety of self-report scales (e.g., Beck Depression
Inventory, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory), with coefficients ranging from 0.53 to 0.86.
Because the OQ-45 is often used to monitor client change during therapy, the
sensitivity of the measure to change is important. Vermeersch and colleagues
(Vermeersch, Lambert, & Burlingame, 2000; Vermeersch et al., 2004) have found the
Total Score and all subscale to be sensitive in reflecting change experienced by clients
following treatment. Additionally, 34 of the 45 individual items were found to be
sensitive to treatment effects.
Clinical Significance and Reliable Change
The clinical cutoff score for the OQ-45 Total Score is 63/64 (Lambert et al., 2004).
Scores of 63 or below are considered to be in the normative range (reflective of the level
of distress typically experienced by individuals in the general population), whereas scores
of 64 or above are classified as being in the clinical range (reflective of a level of distress
experienced by individuals seeking treatment). This cutoff score was derived using
Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) methodology, which is the most commonly used method of
calculating clinical cutoff scores (Ogles, Lunnen, & Bonesteel, 2001). Speer and
Greenbaum (1995) performed a comparative analysis of several existing methods and
endorsed the Jacobson and Truax approach due to its unambiguous calculation and
supporting literature base. The cutoff value, described by Jacobson and Truax as Cutoff
45

C, represents a weighted midpoint between the means of a functional and dysfunctional
sample.
Lambert and colleagues (2004) also applied Jacobson and Truax’s (1991)
formulae to calculate a reliable change index (RCI) for the OQ-45. The RCI represents
the magnitude of change in any direction necessary to be considered reliable (i.e., not due
to chance variation). The RCI is a function of the standard error of measurement, such
that measures of increasing reliability require smaller magnitudes of change in order for
the change to be classified as reliable. The RCI for the OQ-45 Total Score is 14.
Therefore, clients whose Total Score decreases by 14 or more points are considered
reliably improved, whereas clients demonstrating an increase of 14 points or more are
classified as reliably worsened or deteriorated. Clients who begin therapy in the
dysfunctional range (64 or above), demonstrate reliable improvement, and terminate
therapy in the functional range (63 or below) are classified as recovered. Finally, clients
whose Total Scores do not change in any direction by at least 14 points are classified as
having made no change.
Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) formulae, or similar methods, may be applied to
determine clinical cutoffs and RCIs for any continuous-scale measure that has sufficient
normative data. Distinct measures may therefore produce inconsistent classifications of
clinical significance. Beckstead, Hatch, Lambert, Eggett, Goates, and Vermeersch (2003)
examined the degree to which classifications for clinical significance based on the OQ-45
were consistent with those based on other common outcome measures (e.g., Symptom
Checklist-90-R, Derogatis, 1983; Quality of Life Inventory, Frisch, Cornell, Villanueva,
& Retzlaff, 1992; Client Satisfaction Questionnaire-8, Larson, Attkisson, Hargreaves, &
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Nguyen, 1979). The average correspondence among measure classifications of patients
in the functional or dysfunctional range was found to be 85%. Similarly, agreement for
classification of patients as meeting criteria for clinically significant change among the
measures averaged 65%. Classification into categories of clinical significance therefore
appears to be similar across outcome measures, but to vary as a result of the instrument
utilized. Beckstead and colleagues noted that the OQ-45 was most similar to the
Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (Derogatis, 1983).
Feedback with the OQ-45
An innovative feature of the OQ-45 is a supporting software application that
allows for the provision of rapid and standardized feedback to therapists regarding their
clients’ scores. The software, OQ-Analyst (www.oqmeasures.com), provides information
regarding clients’ current scores, distress level, and the presence of any critical item
endorsement (e.g., endorsement of suicidal ideation). Scores are also tracked over time
in order to monitor client change. The decision rules and format of the feedback is now
described further.
Decision rules. Two separate sets of decision algorithms have been developed
for the OQ-45. The first decision rules were developed based on theory and previous
research and are therefore termed rationally-derived. The rationally-derived cutoffs
(described in Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al., 2002) were based on client intake scores,
the number of sessions completed, and change in the OQ-45 Total Score from intake.
Later rules were developed statistically using a large normative database (described
below); they are therefore termed empirically-derived. Three studies (Lambert, Whipple,
Bishop, et al., 2002; Lutz et al., 2006; Spielmans, Masters, & Lambert, 2006) comparing
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the two methods have found the empirical method to be superior in terms of overall
predictive accuracy.
The empirical decision rules were developed by Finch, Lambert, and Schaalje
(2001), utilizing OQ-45 data from over 11,000 clients seen at graduate training clinics,
counseling centers, employee assistance programs, and managed behavioral health care
settings. Each client in the sample had completed a course of therapy with at least two
administrations of the OQ-45. The aggregate of OQ-45 scores at each session for the
entire sample showed a pattern of decelerating recovery curves in which clients made
rapid initial progress which then became more gradual. Finch and colleagues then
divided the sample into 50 distinct groups based on intake score. Each group represented
approximately 2% of the sample and was composed of at least 220 patients. Some
groups represented one discrete score on the OQ-45, whereas groups at the extremes of
the scoring range included patients with a range of intake scores. For each group,
hierarchical linear modeling was used to generate expected recovery curves which
indicate the mean OQ-45 Total Score at each session (1 through 20) for the
corresponding group in the sample.
Following the development of the expected recovery curves, Finch and colleagues
(2001) derived tolerance intervals around each curve based on the expected mean OQ-45
score at each session. For example, a two-tailed 80% confidence interval around the
mean expected score allowed for identification of the 10% percent of clients that were
making the least progress, and therefore might be expected to deteriorate or drop out of
therapy (based on estimates that approximately 10% of patients become worse during
treatment, Lambert & Ogles, 2004). Similarly, a two-tailed 68% tolerance interval was
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calculated for each expected mean by session number. This provided a cutoff for patients
whose rate of change was at least 1 standard deviation above or below the mean.
Alert status. The cutoffs described above form the basis for categorizations of
alert status on the OQ-45 feedback. When a client’s Total Score at a session falls above
the 80% tolerance interval, the alert status of the resulting feedback is “Red,” indicating
that progress is significantly less positive than expected. Similarly, scores falling above
the 68% tolerance interval (but below 80%) result in “Yellow” feedback. Scores in the
middle 68% of scores result in “Green” feedback and scores below the 68% cutoff result
in “White” feedback. The OQ-Analyst also generates written messages which
accompany the alert status. Sample messages include the following:
White feedback—‘The client is functioning in the normal range. Consider
termination.’
Green feedback—‘The rate of change the client is making is in the adequate range.
No change in the treatment plan is recommended.’
Yellow feedback—‘The rate of change the client is making is less than adequate.
Recommendations: consider altering the treatment plan by intensifying treatment,
shifting intervention strategies and monitoring progress especially carefully. This
client may end up with no significant benefit from therapy.’
Red feedback—‘The client is not making the expected level of progress. The
chances are that he/she may drop out of treatment prematurely or have a negative
treatment outcome. Steps should be taken to carefully review this case and decide
upon a new course of action such as referral for medication or intensification of
treatment. The treatment plan should be reconsidered. Consideration should also be
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given to presenting this client at case conference. The client’s readiness for change
may need to be re-assessed.’ (Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al., 2002, p. 153)
Accuracy of Prediction
Lambert and colleagues (e.g., Hannan et al., 2005; Lambert, 2007) have
postulated that the accurate prediction of poor outcomes is essential to the effectiveness
of feedback interventions with the OQ-45. Clients who receive yellow or red feedback at
any time during treatment are considered signal-alarms and are predicted to deteriorate
(operationalized by a demonstrated increase of 14 points or more on the OQ-45 from
intake to termination). The accuracy of these predictions has been evaluated in several
studies (Ellsworth, Lambert, & Johnson, 2006; Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al., 2002;
Lutz et al., 2006; Spielmans, Masters, & Lambert, 2006). Overall hit rates (the
percentage of all clients correctly predicted) have ranged from .68 to .83 for the empirical
decision rules. The average sensitivity of the OQ-45 in correctly identifying patients who
deteriorate is approximately .88 (Lambert, 2007). That is, if 100 patients deteriorate over
the course of treatment, the OQ-45 will identify 88 of them before termination. The
excellent sensitivity of the empirical method comes at the expense of specificity
(approximately 0.82), as the OQ-45 generates a moderate proportion of “false alarms.”
Approximately 18% of clients who did not deteriorate were identified as signal-alarm
cases. Although such patients did not deteriorate as predicted, they were found in two
studies to be less likely than the other patients (who were not identified as alarm cases) to
evidence reliable improvement (Hannan et al., 2005; Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, et al.,
2002).

50

The validity of predictions made by the empirical decision rules may also be
evaluated in terms of positive and negative predictive power. Positive predictive power
refers to the proportion of patients who receive signal alarm feedback and actually
deteriorate. Ellsworth, Lambert, and Johnson (2006) found the positive predictive power
of the OQ-45 to be .27, a relatively unimpressive proportion due to the number of false
positives generated by the empirical decision rules. The negative predictive power,
referring to the proportion of those predicted not to deteriorate who in fact did not, is
much higher. Ellsworth and colleagues found the negative predictive power of the OQ45 to be .99. In other words, patients who do not receive Yellow or Red warnings at any
point during therapy are very unlikely to have deteriorated at termination. However, it
should be noted that these analyses are to be interpreted cautiously due to the use of OQ45 data as both predictor and criterion variables. In other words, false negatives are
precluded almost by definition; it is unlikely for clients who never produce Red or
Yellow warnings based on OQ-45 data to be rated as deteriorated by the OQ-45. The
degree to which OQ-45 predictions of change correspond with alternative criterion
measures should be examined.
Lambert, Whipple, Bishop, Vermeersch, Gray, and Finch (2002) suggested that
the large proportion of false alarms generated by the empirical decision rules has
relatively little real-world cost. As compared to medical fields, where a false positive
may result in intrusive procedures (such as surgery or medication), false positives in
mental health practice are unlikely to create adverse consequences. A practical cost is
that therapists may grow weary of frequent warning feedback (Ellsworth, Lambert, &
Johnson, 2006); therapist frustration with warning feedback may lead them to discount it
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or to undervalue it. Feedback is frequently Yellow or Red in alert status; the empirical
method appears to label 22% to 24% of clients as signal alarms in university counseling
centers. In other settings, this number is likely to be higher. For example, Hawkins and
colleagues (2004) reported that approximately 50% of clients at a hospital-based
outpatient clinic were identified as signal-alarm cases.
Hannan, Lambert, Harmon, Nielsen, Smart, Shimokawa, and Sutton (2005)
compared the empirical prediction system to the clinical judgment of 48 therapists
(graduate student trainees and professionals). Therapists were asked for three
consecutive weeks to predict their patients’ final status following treatment (recovered,
improved but not recovered, no change, or deteriorated) and to rate patients’
improvement up to that point in therapy. Of the 332 clients in the study, 26 were
deteriorated at termination. Therapists predicted only 3 patients to deteriorate, 1 of
whom did deteriorate (as measured by a reliable increase in OQ-45 score). In contrast,
the empirical method based on OQ-45 results produced warnings for 55 patients, 20 of
whom did in fact deteriorate. Based on the results, it appears that overall hit rates
between therapists and statistical prediction may have been similar (due to the number of
false alarms generated by the empirical method), but the statistical predictive method was
much more likely to identify early in the course of treatment those patients at risk for no
benefit from treatment. It bears noting that final outcome in the Hannan et al. study was
measured by the OQ-45, increasing the probability that those patients with unusually high
OQ-45 scores at some point in therapy would be rated by the same instrument as
deteriorated at termination. The statistical prediction technique therefore had an inherent
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advantage as compared to clinicians. The results would be more convincing had a
concurrent outcome criterion been used.
Effects of OQ-45 Feedback
Lambert (2007) reviewed five studies (Harmon et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 2004;
Lambert et al., 2001; Lambert, Whipple, Vermeersch, et al., 2002; Whipple et al., 2003)
regarding the effects of OQ-45 feedback on client outcomes. The five studies shared
many features: a) clients were seen in routine care and received a variety of clinical
diagnoses; b) clients were randomly assigned to feedback or treatment-as-usual
conditions (with the exception of Whipple et al., 2003); c) therapists provided treatment
from a variety of theoretical orientations; d) postgraduate psychologists and graduatestudents each represented about 50% of study therapists; e) therapists in each study saw
patients in both the feedback and treatment-as-usual conditions; f) the OQ-45 was used as
the outcome measure, and decision rules for identifying signal alarm cases remained
constant; g) the length of therapy was determined by client and therapist without external
constraints; and h) patient demographic characteristics were similar (with the exception
of Hawkins et al, 2004, which was conducted in a hospital-based clinic).
Each of the five studies addressed the following main question: does feedback to
therapists regarding client progress improve outcomes? The findings across studies are
summarized below.
Effects of feedback on outcome. Each of the studies reviewed by Lambert
(2007) found that, among “signal alarm” clients (i.e., clients receiving Yellow or Red
feedback at some point during the course of therapy), those whose therapists received
OQ-45 feedback achieved greater improvement than clients whose therapists did not.
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This finding appears to be robust and has been well replicated, with effect sizes ranging
from 0.34 to 0.92 (Lambert, 2007). Lambert noted that such effect sizes compare
favorably to an average effect size of .20 in treatment outcome studies (Lambert & Ogles,
2004). Combined data across studies also demonstrated differences in regards to final
treatment classification (based on Jacobson and Truax, 1991, criteria for clinically
significant and reliable change). Lambert reported that 20% of alarm clients in nofeedback conditions were rated as deteriorated at termination, whereas the percentage of
deterioration for clients whose therapists received feedback ranged from 8% to 15%. The
percentage of clients classified as reliably improved was higher for alarm patients in the
feedback conditions than for patients in treatment-as-usual conditions. These data
provide evidence for the clinical utility of feedback, in addition to statistical significance.
Whereas all five studies demonstrated improved outcomes for signal-alarm
clients, results were less conclusive across all clients. Indeed, only two studies (Harmon
et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 2004) found significant differences between the feedback and
no-feedback groups when including on-track clients in the analyses. Lambert (2007)
noted that “it appeared to make little difference in outcome for feedback (green or white
messages) to have been given [to clients who progressed as expected in therapy]” (p.
10).
Effects of feedback on attendance. Examination of the effects of feedback on
client attendance rates is important in order to evaluate whether feedback results in
improvements in the cost-effective provision of services. Findings regarding attendance
have been inconsistent. Three studies (Harmon et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2001;
Lambert, Whipple, Vermeersch, et al., 2002) found an increased average number of
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sessions for alarm clients in feedback conditions, whereas no such difference was found
in the other studies. Observing this discrepancy, Harmon and colleagues stated, “it seems
fair to conclude that the positive effects of feedback can be obtained with and without
extending treatment length” (p. 390). Findings have also been mixed regarding
attendance rates among on-track clients. Lambert (2007) reported that feedback
decreased sessions by an average of 0.66 sessions in about half the studies. It is
interesting to note that in the two studies (Harmon et al., 2007; Hawkins et al., 2004) that
found improved outcomes for on-track groups, on-track clients who received feedback
did not differ from their no-feedback counterparts in number of sessions attended. In
conjunction with the finding (in Lambert et al., 2001, and Whipple et al., 2003) that ontrack clients in the feedback conditions achieved equivalent results to their counterparts
in fewer average sessions, the results suggest that clients deemed as on-track may
improve at a slightly faster rate when therapists receive feedback.
Effects of feedback on clinical judgment. Haderlie (2009) examined the
validity of 5 novice psychotherapists’ judgments of client change over the course of 5
months of practicum experience during which therapists received weekly feedback from
their clients’ OQ-45 results. Following each session, but before receiving feedback,
therapists estimated their clients’ change from the previous session to the current session
using a 7-point Likert-type scale. In order to evaluate change in judgment accuracy over
time, the first and last 5 sessions of each therapist were examined as blocks. The mean
correlation between individual therapists’ estimates of client change from the previous
session and change over the same period as indicated by the OQ-45 was .06 for the first
block, reflecting virtually no validity of judgment. By the last block, the mean
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correlation had increased to .56, a significant difference from the first block. The
therapists therefore increased dramatically in their abilities to estimate client progress.
However, the degree to which receiving feedback contributed to the observed gains
cannot be known due to the uncontrolled nature of the design. However, given the
consistent finding that clinical experience is at best weakly related to the validity of
judgments, it seems likely that the feedback contributed significantly to the increased
judgment accuracy.

Present Study
The primary purpose of the present research was to examine whether providing
clinicians with feedback regarding client progress lead to increased accuracy of
judgments regarding client progress. Specifically, therapists were asked to rate client
progress immediately following each session. Client progress was rated in terms of
change from the beginning of treatment as well as change from the previous session.
Because the judgments were made on the basis of information and observations gained
directly from sessions with the clients, therapists’ judgments were a naturalistic reflection
of the judgment of client change in psychotherapy. Clinical judgments of change were
compared to changes on the OQ-45, a self-report measure of distress and dysfunction.
The effect of feedback on clinicians’ confidence in their clinical judgments regarding
client progress was also examined. Therapists were randomly assigned to either receive
feedback following each judgment or to receive no feedback. The current research
therefore contributes to the clinical judgment literature by systematically examining the
effects of feedback on the accuracy of clinical judgment. Although it has been widely
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suggested that feedback is essential to improving the accuracy of judgment, very little
research has examined this possibility.
The primary hypothesis examined in the present research concerned the effect of
OQ-45 feedback on the validity of clinical judgment.
Hypothesis I: Clinicians who received OQ-45 feedback would demonstrate
greater increases in judgment accuracy than clinicians who did not receive
feedback.
Feedback is widely believed to be an important, and possibly necessary, means of
enhancing clinical judgment. Additionally, some limited research has supported the
positive effects of feedback on judgment accuracy (e.g., Goldberg, 1968; Graham, 1971).
It was therefore expected that clinicians who received feedback would demonstrate more
accurate judgments of client change at the conclusion of data collection than clinicians
who did not receive feedback. In statistical terms, a group (feedback, no-feedback) by
time (beginning, end of data collection) interaction was expected in which the rate of
improvement in judgment accuracy would be more steeply positive for clinicians who
received feedback. The effect was expected to be observed both for judgments of
progress since the beginning of treatment and judgments of progress since the previous
session.
Hypothesis II: Clinicians who received OQ-45 feedback would demonstrate
greater increases in confidence regarding their judgments as compared to
clinicians who did not receive feedback.
The second hypothesis concerned the effects of feedback on clinicians’
confidence in their judgments. Although the provision of additional information does not
57

universally lead to increased confidence in judgments, it has been found to in some
studies (e.g., Oskamp, 1965; Trueblood & Binder, 1997). It was expected that in the
current study, receiving OQ-45 feedback for each session would result in increased
confidence in the accuracy of judgments regarding client progress.
Hypothesis III: Clinicians who received OQ-45 feedback would demonstrate
greater calibration of confidence ratings than clinicians who did not receive
feedback.
In addition to examining the absolute value of clinician confidence ratings, the
effects of feedback on the appropriateness of confidence ratings were of interest. The
appropriateness of confidence ratings is most commonly evaluated by calculating each
judge’s calibration, which is equivalent to the absolute difference between the mean of
confidence ratings and the overall proportion of correct decisions. Perfect calibration is
reflected by a score of 0.0, whereas values moving away from 0.0 reflect poorer
calibration. Although the effects of feedback on the appropriateness of clinicians’
confidence ratings have received little examination, research on the confidence-accuracy
relationship in eyewitness testimony has suggested that the accuracy of confidence may
improve with feedback (Kassin, 1985; Perfect, Hollins, & Hunt, 2000). It was therefore
hypothesized that clinicians who received feedback would demonstrate greater
calibration than those who did not.
In addition to the hypotheses outlined above, several research questions received
preliminary examination. One of these related to individual differences among therapists.
Psychotherapy outcome research has indicated significant variability among individual
clinicians in outcomes (e.g., Okiishi et al., 2006) and indicated that individual differences
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among therapists account for 5% to 9% of the variance in outcomes (Crits-Cristoph et al.,
1991). Spengler, White, Ægisdöttir, Maugherman, and colleagues (2009) noted that the
degree of individual differences in judgment accuracy among therapists has not been
examined. Additionally, it was unknown whether the accuracy of individual clinicians’
judgment is related to the outcomes experienced by their clients. Given the primary
importance of clinical judgment across the course of psychotherapy, it is possible that
judgment accuracy will be related to client outcomes. “Outcome” data was unavailable
for some clients in the present research given that the period of data collection did not
always include their first or last sessions. This question was therefore examined in terms
of the rate of change observed over the course of data collection.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Participants
Participants in the study included therapists at the Center for Individual, Couple,
and Family Counseling (CICFC) and the student Counseling and Psychological Services
(CAPS), both at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. All therapists at CAPS and all
psychology trainees at CICFC were invited to participate. Participating therapists were
given the option of providing an email address in order to be entered in a drawing for one
of two $25 gift cards to a bookstore. An original total of 15 therapists consented to
participate in the study. In order to maximize confidentiality given the collegial
relationship of the current researcher with many of the participants, demographic
information was collected separately from all other data. Consenting therapists had a
mean age of 32.6 years (SD = 11.2) and were predominantly female (66.7%). Regarding
ethnicity, 60 percent of the sample was Caucasian. Other reported ethnic identities
included Hispanic (n = 2), Asian-American, Pacific Islander, Indian, and mixed.
Following recruitment, 4 therapists did not subsequently provide enough data for
inclusion. Another therapist’s data was not included because procedural errors had
resulted in inconsistent provision of feedback. The resulting sample for data analyses
included 10 therapists, with 5 in both conditions. Therapists in the final sample had been
practicing psychotherapy for an average of 10.70 months (SD = 17.85). This figure was
positively skewed, in that all therapists but one reported less than 12 months of clinical
experience. Although the professional therapist in the sample had significantly more
clinical experience than other participants, data from this therapist was consistent with
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other data. Additionally, the exclusion of this therapist did not alter the observed trends
in the data. The therapist was therefore included in analyses in order to maximize data.
Two therapists reported having earned doctorate degrees, two held master’s degrees, and
six reported that their highest degree was a bachelor’s degree. Participating therapists
were predominantly doctoral students in a clinical psychology program; one therapist
reported a counseling psychology background. Each therapist reported data for multiple
sessions (M = 36.1, SD = 22.7, Range = 11 to 77) with multiple clients (M = 5.4, SD =
2.2, Range = 3 to 9). All therapists had some prior clinical experience with the OQ-45;
only one reported having previously received formal feedback.

Measures
OQ-45 and Feedback
Client progress was measured with the Outcome Questionnaire-45 (OQ-45;
Lambert et al., 2004). The OQ-45 is a 45-item self-report measure of general distress and
dysfunction. Total scores for the 45-item measure range from 0 to 180, with higher scores
indicative of greater distress. As reviewed above, strong evidence has been compiled for
both the reliability and validity of the OQ-45. Additionally, the OQ-45 total score as well
as the majority of individual items are sensitive to client change over time. The measure
generates three subscale scores (Symptom Distress, Interpersonal Relations, and Social
Role). However, only the total score was used for data analyses in the current research
due to limited support for the OQ-45 subscales. Feedback reports to therapists were
generated based on clients’ OQ-45 results utilizing the OQ-Analyst software. Feedback
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was based on the empirical decision rules developed by Finch et al. (2001), as described
above.
Therapist Registration Form
Information regarding therapist experience was collected at the beginning of data
collection through a Therapist Registration Form (see Appendix). Therapists were asked
to provide a 4-digit code number for use throughout data collection. Reviewers of clinical
judgment literature (e.g., Spengler, White, Ægisdöttir, Maugherman, et al., 2009) have
noted that studies are often limited by unreliable measurement of clinical experience.
Spengler and colleagues suggested that “experience might be best measured using
multiple items as well as with proximal and distal measures” (p. 422). The Therapist
Registration Form therefore includes both categorical and continuous measures of
experience, including the highest degree completed, field of practice, and the number of
months for which a clinician has practiced psychotherapy. Additionally, whether
clinicians have previously used the OQ-45, whether they received feedback, and for how
long was assessed.
Therapist Estimate of Change
Therapists’ judgments regarding client change were ascertained using a Therapist
Estimate of Change form (see Appendix). Estimates of change from the previous session
to the current session and from the beginning of treatment to the current session were
made on separate one-item Likert-type rating scales. Each scale consists of 7 points (1
through 7). Therapists estimated the direction and the amount of change made by clients
from the previous point of reference. The three points on the right side of both scales are
labeled much improved, somewhat improved, and slightly improved. The three points on
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the left are equivalent except that worse is substituted for improved. The midpoints are
labeled no change. Likert-type scales generally demonstrate adequate reliability; the
validity of Likert scales has not been evaluated as extensively (Chang, 1994). The scales
were designed to include a mid-point because it was necessary to include a point
reflecting no change in either direction. There is no general consensus regarding the
optimal number of scale points; some investigators (e.g., Brown, Widing, & Coulter,
1991; Matell & Jacoby, 1971) have found the reliability of items to be independent of the
number of points. Others have noted that reliability increases with the variability of a
scale; however, too many scale points may lead to method variance by invoking extreme
response sets (Chang, 1994). Given that several authors have advocated 7-point scales as
the most reliable (e.g., Cicchetti, Showalter, & Tyrer, 1985; Ramsay, 1973), 7 points
were used for the Therapist Estimate of Change items. Although single-item measures
have been criticized as low in reliability (Schmidt & Hunter, 1996), some researchers
have found such measures to demonstrate adequate internal consistency (.66) and testretest reliability (.82; Matell & Jacoby, 1971). Single-item measures were utilized in the
present study due to the necessity of creating a brief measure of therapist change
estimates that could be completed following each session. Additionally, it is likely that
therapists make global judgments regarding client progress; a single-item estimate of
change was therefore expected to adequately reflect clinical judgment of progress.
Therapists’ level of confidence in both estimates was also ascertained through the
Therapist Estimate of Change form. Therapists were instructed to base their confidence
ratings solely on the direction of change without considering the magnitude of change.
Focusing on the direction of change allowed estimates to be converted into a categorical
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variable with three levels (improved, no change, worsened) that was subsequently
utilized to examine the appropriateness of confidence ratings. Therapists indicate their
level of confidence in each judgment from .30 (the rounded probability of being correct
by chance) to 1.00, in increments of .10. The resulting data was used to calculate
calibration for each judge.

Procedure
Therapists who opted to participate were oriented to the study and signed
informed consent prior to beginning data collection. Clients at the CICFC are routinely
administered the OQ-45 at each session for program evaluation and clinical training
purposes and therefore experienced no variation from standard procedures. Thus, clients
of participating therapists at CICFC who had consented to the use of archival research
data were included without study-specific consent procedures. A majority of clients at
CICFC were ongoing therapy clients who had met with therapists for multiple sessions
prior to the beginning of data collection; baseline data regarding symptom severity was
therefore unavailable. At CAPS, clients of participating therapists were invited by those
therapists to participate at the time of their first sessions. Therapists provided an
informed consent document describing the general research purposes and informing
clients of study procedures, which included completing an OQ-45 upon arrival to the
waiting room prior to each session. Participating clients self-identified as study
participants upon checking in and OQ-45’s were provided by CAPS front desk staff.
Given that therapists were the primary subjects of interest, no client demographic
information was collected at either clinic. Data were collected from a total of 47 clients
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(38 at CICFC and 9 at CAPS). Individual clients provided data for multiple sessions,
ranging from 1 to 22.
Participating therapists completed a registration form at the beginning of data
collection in which each therapist provided a 4-digit code number that was used
throughout the research. Therapist identities were therefore unknown to researchers at all
stages of the research and study data is anonymous. The registration form also elicited
basic information regarding therapists’ training and clinical experience, as well as
information regarding any previous experience with feedback from the OQ-45.
Therapists completed two separate pages including a demographics form which was not
associated with therapist code numbers, and an optional form in which they provided
email addresses for consideration in a drawing for one of two gift cards. These forms
were stored separately from therapist registration forms.
Following registration, each therapist was randomly assigned to either a Feedback
(FB) or a No-Feedback (NFB) condition. Block random assignment was utilized to
ensure equal sample sizes in the FB and NFB conditions and therefore preserve statistical
power, which was important given the small number of therapists available for
participation in the study.
Data collection occurred from March 2010 to January 2011. During the data
collection phase, clinic staff administered the OQ-45 to clients as they arrived for therapy
sessions. The measure takes approximately five minutes to complete on average,
although administration may range from three minutes to 15 minutes in rare
circumstances (Lambert et al., 2004). After clients completed the OQ-45, the
questionnaires were set aside for researchers rather than delivered directly to clinicians.
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Immediately following each session, therapists completed a brief Therapist Estimate of
Change form in which they estimated client change from the previous to the current
session and indicated their confidence in the accuracy of their estimation. The Therapist
Estimate of Change and OQ-45 forms were collected by researchers twice weekly for
data collection. The OQ-45 forms were scored and paper feedback reports were generated
using OQ-Analyst software (www.OQmeasures.com). OQ-45 forms and associated
feedback reports were delivered to therapists in the FB condition within two days of each
session in order to allow them to review the reports prior to their next session with the
client. Thus, feedback was essentially delayed one session: feedback reports received by
therapists reflected client change over the time period from two sessions previous to the
most recent session. Additionally, therapists’ estimates of client progress were made
following sessions, whereas client OQ-45 data was obtained prior to the session. This
schedule was necessary in order to elicit therapist estimates of change before providing
feedback. The schedule was also consistent with those of previous research studies that
demonstrated beneficial effects of OQ-45 feedback (e.g., Harmon et al., 2007). OQ-45
forms for therapists in the NFB condition were stored securely by researchers until the
conclusion of data collection and then returned to client files.

Data Analyses
In order to examine changes in criterion variables (e.g. accuracy of judgments,
confidence ratings, calibration) from the beginning of data collection to the conclusion of
data collection, it was necessary to identify a baseline and final group of judgments for
each therapist. This was complicated by the variability in the number of judgments made
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by each therapist during data collection. The first 5 judgments made overall by each
therapist were therefore considered baseline performance (i.e., criterion variables were
calculated using only those sessions). Similarly, the last 5 judgments made by each
therapist were utilized to calculate outcome performance. A 5-session cutoff was utilized
in the current study because it was considered to be a minimum number of sessions in
order to produce reliable estimates, and allowed for the inclusion of the maximum
number of therapists possible (e.g., a cutoff of 10 sessions would have necessitated the
exclusion of 4 additional therapists). The baseline and outcome blocks therefore
represented the first and last 5 judgments made by the therapist during the course of data
collection; these 5 sessions included multiple sessions with the same client in some cases.
Given the differences in the number of judgments and subsequent feedback
administrations per therapist, the correlation between total number of sessions completed
and each criterion variable was examined; where this correlation was significant, the
number of sessions completed was utilized as a covariate for analyses.
The accuracy of therapists’ judgments of client progress was estimated in two
manners. The first was to examine the “hit rate” of therapists’ judgments of the direction
of change. A judgment was considered a “hit” if the therapist estimated that client
progress had been in the same direction indicated by the client’s OQ-45 self-report (i.e.,
comparing the OQ-45 Total score at current session to the Total score at the previous
session). Reducing estimates to the direction of change allowed for a standard criterion of
accuracy.
The accuracy of judgments was also estimated by calculating the correlation
between therapists’ estimates of client progress (on a Likert scale from 1 to 7) and client
67

progress as measured by the OQ-45. This correlation was calculated for each therapist
individually based on all ratings made by the therapist. Although this method of
operationalizing judgment accuracy does not provide an absolute criterion of accuracy, it
examines the degree to which therapists had a “feel” for client progress and altered their
judgments in conjunction with client change.
All estimates of judgment accuracy were calculated on the basis of judgments of
progress since the previous session. This judgment was considered a more difficult and
more important judgment, given that it typically requires finer-grade distinctions in client
functioning and status. Additionally, data from each therapist’s first session with each
client was unavailable, making impossible the examination of accuracy of judgments
regarding change from the first session.
The appropriateness of confidence ratings was computed using Lichtenstein and
Fischoff’s (1977) formula for calibration, which is equal to the absolute difference
between the mean of the probability (confidence) responses and the overall proportion
correct (hit rate). In order to increase the validity of the outcome criterion (i.e., the
direction of change on the OQ-45), the Standard Error of Measurement (SEM) of the
OQ-45 was placed around the value 0 on the OQ-45 total score. Change values falling
within this range were considered to reflect no change. An SEM of 6.57 was estimated
for the OQ-45 Total Score based on a reported internal consistency coefficient of .93
(Lambert et al., 1996) and a standard deviation of 24.84 at pre-test in outpatient settings
(Lambert et al., 2004). Therefore, change scores falling within 3 points of 0 were coded
as no change.
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Because “outcome data” (i.e., estimates of client status at the beginning and end
of treatment) were not available for each client, the effectiveness of therapy was
considered by examining the rate of change for each client during the course of data
collection. A rate of change was calculated for each client by dividing observed change
on the OQ-45 Total Score from the beginning to the end of data collection by the number
of sessions attended by the client. Experience variables were not utilized in the analyses,
given the limited variability of experience among therapists in the current sample.
The limited number of therapists available for the current study led to small
groups (n = 5 for both conditions) and therefore low statistical power. Given the limited
power, statistical significance was unlikely for most analyses. Results are therefore
considered exploratory and are discussed in terms of observed trends and effect sizes.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
In order to evaluate potential pre-existing differences between therapists in the FB
and NFB conditions, group means were compared utilizing independent-samples t tests.
For all criterion variables (e.g., judgment accuracy, confidence ratings, calibration),
preliminary differences were examined by utilizing the first 5 data points for each
therapist. No significant differences were found for therapist experience, judgment
accuracy (as measured by hit rate or by correlation), confidence ratings, calibration, or
the number of sessions completed during data collection. See Table 1 for a summary of
these preliminary analyses. There was some notable difference between conditions in the
initial judgment hit rate, as therapists in the feedback condition demonstrated greater
accuracy than those in the no-feedback condition. Additionally, initial calibration was
better (lower) among therapists in the feedback condition. The mean number of months
of clinical experience also differed somewhat between groups, primarily due to the
inclusion of one professional clinician in the feedback group, whereas all other study
therapists were practicum students (as reflected in the discrepancy between standard
deviations for experience means in the FB and NFB conditions).

Descriptive Statistics
Mean ratings for the Therapist Estimate of Change (TEC) form are reported in
Table 2. Means were calculated by therapist first and then combined as grand means in
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Table 1
Initial Differences between Feedback (FB) and No-Feedback (NFB) Groups
FB
Variable

NFB
M

SD

Cohen’s d

17.20 24.23

4.20

4.87

0.74

Hit ratea

0.50

0.20

0 .25

0.19

1.28

Correlationa

0.08

0.59

0.14

0.25

0.13

From firsta

0.83

0.08

0.81

0.09

0.23

From prev. a

0.81

0.04

0.83

0.09

0.29

Initial Calibrationa

0.30

0.23

0.56

0.26

1.06

Number of sessions

37.40 23.08

34.80

23.08

0.11

Experience (mos.)

M

SD

Initial Judgment Accuracy

Initial Confidence Ratings

a

Value calculated using the first 5 data points for each therapist

order to account for variability in the number of ratings made by each therapist. On
average, therapists were slightly more positive than “neutral” in estimating change from
the previous session. When considering progress since their first session with a client,
therapists tended to rate change as “slightly improved” to “somewhat improved” on
average. Therapists reported high confidence ratings for their judgments of client
progress.
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Table 2
Mean Scores for Therapist Estimate of Change Across all Therapists
Item

Mean

SD

Range

In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed
since the previous session?

4.65a

0.59

1 to 7

How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment
regarding the direction of change (worse, no change, or
improved) since the previous session?

80.34

6.70

50 to 100

In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed
since your first session with the client?

5.46a

0.60

1 to 7

How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment
83.58
8.52
50 to 100
regarding the direction of change (worse, no change, or
improved) since your first session?
Note. Means (and accompanying standard deviations) reflect the grand mean of
individual therapist means.
a

Responses based upon a 7-point scale with 1 = much worse, 2 = somewhat worse, 3 =
slightly worse, 4 = no change, 5 = slightly improved, 6 = somewhat improved, and 7 =
much improved.

Examination of raw data (without collapsing by therapist) indicated that when
judging progress since the previous session, therapists rated clients as improved at 44.5
percent of sessions; clients were rated as having made no change at 39.2 percent of
sessions and as having deteriorated at 16.2 percent of sessions. Corresponding OQ-45
data reflected improvement at 37.2 percent of sessions, no change at 28.5 percent of
sessions, and deterioration at 34.3 percent of sessions. For judgments of change since the
first session, therapists’ estimates were as follows: 79.4 percent improved, 16.8 percent
no change, and 3.8 percent deteriorated. Corresponding OQ-45 data were not available
given that many clients in the study had already been attending sessions before their
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inclusion in the study and therefore data regarding their initial severity had not been
obtained.

Judgment Accuracy
Hit Rate
The accuracy of therapist estimates regarding the direction of client change from
one session to another was estimated by calculating hit rates for each therapist. The mean
hit rate across all therapists was 0.36 (SD = 0.14). On average, therefore, therapists
performed at approximately chance level when making estimates regarding the direction
of change (as there were three available response categories: positive change, negative
change, or no change). Hit rates for individual therapists ranged from 0.20 to 0.64.
Judgment accuracy as measured by hit rates was unrelated to the number of sessions
completed by individual therapists, r(8) = .19.
The effect of feedback on judgment accuracy was evaluated through examination
of accuracy as a function of group assignment and time. The time factor was
operationalized by comparing hit rates for each therapist’s first and last 5 sessions.
Although judgment accuracy increased slightly across the course of the study, from a
total mean hit rate of .38 (SD = .23) to .42 (SD = .13), this did not appear to be a
meaningful increase (partial eta squared = .05) and it was not significant. On average,
judgment accuracy increased among therapists in the no-feedback condition from the first
5 to the last 5 sessions. In contrast, judgment accuracy decreased slightly among
therapists in the feedback condition from the first 5 to the last 5 sessions. This interaction
effect was relatively large (partial eta squared = .33) and was contrary to the
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hypothesized results, in that feedback was found to be detrimental to judgment accuracy.
See Table 3 for a summary of all between-group comparisons.
Correlations
Judgment accuracy was also evaluated by examining the correlation between
therapists’ judgments of client change and observed change on the OQ-45 at each
specific session. The grand mean of individual therapist correlations was -.01 (SD = .41),
indicating that therapists’ estimates of client change did not tend to covary with change as
measured by the OQ-45. Correlations for individual therapists varied widely, from -.51 to
.61. There was a moderate positive relationship between these correlations and the
number of sessions completed by the therapist, r(8) = .57, indicating that correlations
tended to improve as therapists completed more sessions. Estimates of judgment accuracy
based on correlation were not related to estimates of judgment accuracy using the hit rate
criterion, r(8) = -.03.
The correlation between therapists’ estimates of client change from the previous
session and change as measured by the OQ-45 was utilized as a dependent measure to
examine the effect of feedback on clinical judgments. A repeated-measures ANCOVA
was conducted, with feedback condition as a between-groups factor. The number of
sessions completed by the therapist was utilized as a covariate for the analysis, given the
relationship between sessions and judgment accuracy as measured by correlation.
Baseline and outcome periods were operationalized as above. Mean correlations
increased somewhat from the first 5 (M = .05) to the last 5 sessions (M = .19); this effect
was very small (partial eta squared = .01). Inspection of means revealed that average
correlations increased in the NFB condition, whereas correlations for therapists who
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Table 3
Condition by Time Interactions for Outcome Variables
FB
Variable

NFB

M

SD

M

SD

First 5

0.50

0.20

0.25

0.19

Last 5

0.40

0.00

0.45

0.19

First 5

0.08

0.59

0.03

0.10

Last 5

0.03

0.60

0.40

0.38

First 5

0.83

0.08

0.81

0.09

Last 5

0.81

0.12

0.89

0.06

First 5

0.81

0.04

0.83

0.09

Last 5

0.74

0.08

0.83

0.07

First 5

0.30

0.23

0.56

0.26

Last 5

0.33

0.09

0.36

0.20

partial eta squared

Judgment Accuracy
Hit rate

0.33

Correlation

0.19a

Confidence Ratings
From first

0.60a

From previous

0.47a

Calibration

0.21

Note. partial eta squared effect size statistic is for interaction of variables condition
(Feedback, FB, or No-Feedback, NFB) and time (first 5 and last 5 sessions completed by
each therapist).
a
The number of sessions completed by the therapist was utilized as a covariate for
calculation of effect size.

75

received feedback slightly decreased on average. This effect was moderate in size
(partial eta squared = .19). ANCOVA results were not statistically significant.

Rate of Therapeutic Change
Across all clients, the mean rate of change in OQ-45 scores was -0.53 (SD =
2.86). In other words, the average client’s OQ-45 Total Score decreased by
approximately one half of a point per session during the period of data collection.
In order to evaluate the possibility that therapists who made more accurate
judgments would also demonstrate better therapeutic outcomes, the correlation between
judgment accuracy and client rate of change was examined. The rate of change
experienced by clients of individual therapists was unrelated to therapists’ judgment
accuracy as measured by either hit rates, r(8) = .11, or the correlation of therapist
estimates and OQ-45 change, r(8) = -.19.
The relationship between judgment accuracy and rate of change was also
examined at the individual client level (without collapsing means by therapist). The hit
rate of therapist judgments for individual clients was not related to the rate of change
experienced by the clients, r(37) = -.04. Therefore, clients whose therapists made more
accurate judgments about their progress were no more likely to experience positive
change.
Clients of therapists in the feedback condition demonstrated more rapid symptom
reduction (M = -0.77, SD = 1.48) as compared to clients of therapists who did not receive
feedback (M = -0.04, SD = 0.90). The observed effect of feedback condition was
moderate, Cohen’s d = 0.61.
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Confidence
Therapists tended to report high levels of confidence in their estimates of client
progress since the previous session, and since their first session with the client. The
mean confidence rating for judgments regarding change from the first session was 0.84
(SD = .09, Range = .68 to .95). Similarly, confidence ratings for judgments regarding
change from the previous session averaged .80 (SD = .07, Range = .66 to .88). The
correlation between confidence and judgment accuracy was investigated through
examination of the correlation between therapists’ confidence ratings and hit rates for
judgments regarding change from the previous session. A negative correlation was
observed, r(8) = -.42. Overall, therapists who reported greater confidence in their
judgments tended to be less accurate. Confidence ratings for judgments of change from
the previous session were negatively correlated with the number of sessions completed by
the therapist, r(8) = -.60. A negative relationship was also observed between the number
of sessions completed and confidence ratings for judgments of change from the first
session, r(8) = -.44. Results indicated that as the number of sessions completed by a
therapist increased, confidence scores tended to decrease.
The effect of feedback on therapists’ confidence ratings was explored by
examining mean confidence ratings by group and time. Each therapist’s first and last 5
confidence ratings were utilized as endpoints for the time factor. The number of sessions
completed by each therapist was used as a covariate for the analysis. Confidence ratings
regarding estimates of change from the first session with the client to the time of
judgment were examined first. Confidence ratings increased slightly from the first 5 (M
= .82, SD = .08) to the last 5 sessions (M = .85, SD = .10). This effect was relatively
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large, partial eta squared = .25. Results indicated that therapists in the no-feedback
condition made higher confidence ratings at the last 5 sessions than at the first 5 sessions.
In contrast, confidence ratings for therapists who received feedback slightly decreased
from the first 5 to the last 5 sessions. The effect of this interaction was large, partial eta
squared = .60.
The effect of feedback on confidence ratings was also evaluated utilizing
confidence ratings regarding client change from the previous session. Confidence ratings
tended to decrease from the first 5 sessions (M = .82, SD = .07) to the last 5 sessions (M =
.78, SD = .09), representing a large effect of time, partial eta squared = .54. Examination
of means indicated that confidence ratings tended to decrease for therapists who received
feedback, whereas ratings remained similar for therapists who did not receive feedback.
This effect was relatively large, partial eta squared = .47. Results were consistent for
both confidence ratings, in that final ratings were lower for therapists who received
feedback than for those in the no-feedback condition. In both cases, the time by
condition interaction effect was large.

Calibration
In addition to the raw value of confidence ratings, the appropriateness of
confidence ratings was examined by calculating calibration scores for each therapist.
Calibration scores reflect the absolute difference between a therapist’s overall judgment
accuracy (hit rate) and average confidence rating related to the specific judgment
(estimating the direction of client progress from the previous session). Lower scores
therefore indicate better calibration, with a score of 0.0 denoting perfect calibration. The
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mean calibration score across therapists was .45 (SD = .18), which reflected a general
pattern of confidence ratings (M = .80) being greater than hit rates (M = .36). Individual
therapists’ calibration scores varied considerably, from near-perfect calibration in one
therapist (.02) to very poor calibration (.65). The relationship between calibration scores
and the number of sessions completed by the therapist was negative, r(8) = -.38,
indicating that calibration scores tended to improve (decrease) slightly as the number of
sessions increased.
Calibration scores were examined as a function of group and time. On average,
calibration improved from the first 5 (M = .43, SD = .26) to the last 5 sessions (M = .35,
SD = .15; this effect was moderate, partial eta squared = .13. Calibration improved
among therapists in the no-feedback condition from baseline to the conclusion of data
collection; for therapists in the feedback condition, calibration remained similar from
baseline to the conclusion of data collection. Although this effect was notable, partial eta
squared = .21, it was primarily due to pre-intervention differences between groups;
calibration was similar between groups at outcome.

Stability of Variables
In order to examine the degree to which individual differences in study variables
were stable over time, the correlation of individual therapists’ scores at the first and last 5
sessions was examined. Results are summarized in Table 4. Hit rates at baseline were
not predictive of hit rates at outcome; in contrast, there was a moderate relationship
between accuracy as measured by correlation from baseline to outcome, indicating that
therapists who were more responsive to fluctuations in client progress tended to remain
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so over time. Confidence was highly stable for judgments regarding client progress from
both the most recent and from the first session. Calibration (which is calculated on the
basis of hit rate and confidence and therefore not independent) was moderately stable
over time.

Table 4
Stability of Variables within Therapists from First 5 Sessions to Last 5 Sessions
Variable

r

df

Hit Rate

-.17

(6)

Correlation

.39

(5)

From First

.60

(8)

From Previous

.68

(8)

.35

(6)

Judgment Accuracy

Confidence

Calibration
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of
standardized feedback on the accuracy of therapists’ judgments regarding client progress.
Judgment accuracy was estimated in two distinct methods: 1) calculation of a “hit rate”
for each therapist (i.e., the proportion of total estimates in which the direction of change
estimated by the therapist was congruent with the direction of change indicated by the
OQ-45); and 2) examination of the correlation between therapist estimates of change and
OQ-45 change scores. Both methods therefore relied upon OQ-45 data as an indicator of
client status; the limitations of this approach are discussed below. Somewhat
surprisingly, these two methods of operationalizing judgment accuracy were not related;
improvements in the overall correlation between therapist and OQ-45 estimates did not
predict improvement in hit rates. In some cases, therapists’ estimates paralleled changes
in the OQ-45 but remained inaccurate in the absolute direction of change specified. In
other cases, therapists’ estimates were more accurate in terms of hit rate but did not tend
to covary with OQ-45 changes. Generally, judgment researchers have used the “hit rate”
method as a primary measure of judgment validity (accuracy), in part because many
studies examine categorical judgments (e.g., diagnosis); however, research regarding
more dimensional or quantitative judgments, such as client progress, may also utilize the
correlation method. Given that both methods appear to measure different outcomes, it is
unclear whether one method is to be favored; future research may benefit from
incorporating both methods. It is notable that the correlation method was more stable in
the current study and may therefore be preferred, particularly for research involving small
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sample sizes. An alternate approach would be to have therapists estimate the client’s
current status at the time of session using a standardized measure (e.g., Global
Assessment of Functioning), without directly comparing the status to a previous point.
This would allow for comparison of parallel judgments made by clients and therapists;
however, this approach would be a less direct means of examining the extent to which
therapists estimate accurately client progress, which requires not only a judgment of
current status but also judgment and recall of client status at a previous point in time.
Overall judgment accuracy was surprisingly low in the current study as measured
by either method of assessing accuracy. The overall hit rate for estimates of the direction
of client change was 0.36, which represents approximately chance performance (as the
three possibilities were improvement, deterioration, or no change). Similarly, the overall
correlation between therapists’ estimates and progress as measured by the OQ-45 was .01. Accuracy increased only slightly from baseline to the conclusion of data collection;
however, accuracy did increase as the number of judgments made by the individual
therapists increased. This relationship was particularly notable for accuracy as measured
by correlation, which was strongly related to the number of sessions completed by the
therapist (r = .57). It is possible that accuracy as measured by hit rates is limited by
therapists’ tendency to be overly optimistic regarding the direction of change, and
particularly by therapists’ hesitance to rate clients as deteriorated. Therapists may have
become more attuned to fluctuations in client progress over time while continuing to
overestimate the absolute amount of change being made. (And given the slow progress
that is typical for many psychotherapy clients, such “naïve optimism” on a therapist’s
part may not be entirely undesirable as prevention against burnout.)
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In a previous study (Haderlie, 2009), judgment accuracy as measured by
correlation increased dramatically over time among novice therapists at the beginning of
their first practicum experience. Therapists in the current study were primarily first-year
practicum students as well, although they had been practicing for approximately 6
months prior to the beginning of data collection. It is possible that therapists orient
relatively quickly to client status as they begin to accrue clinical experience, and
therefore improvements were less notable in the current study. Another possibility is that
repetition with the judgment task itself (i.e., repeatedly engaging in the process of
considering available data and making a judgment regarding client change) leads to
improved accuracy; this hypothesis is supported by the relationship between the number
of judgments made and accuracy in the current study, although the relationship was
relatively weak when looking at hit rates. The overall effect of time may have been
restricted due to the fact that therapists completed varied numbers of sessions, and in
some cases therapists completed relatively few sessions (minimum was 11).
Feedback did not have a positive effect on judgment accuracy in the current study
as measured by either method of assessing accuracy, and was in fact detrimental to
accuracy in both cases. As estimated by either method, judgment accuracy decreased
slightly across time for therapists who received feedback. Conversely, therapists in the
no-feedback condition demonstrated relatively large improvements in judgment accuracy
over time, as measured by either method. It is clear that feedback did not improve
judgment accuracy in the current sample, contrary to the original hypothesis. Given the
extended theoretical literature suggesting that feedback is a crucial element of improving
clinical judgment, the observed pattern was unexpected. It should be noted that the
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trends in the current study are based on small sample sizes and would need to be
replicated. It is possible that the relatively delayed nature of feedback in the current
methodology decreased its effectiveness. Additionally, timing differences in the
administration of the OQ-45 (before session) and the TEC (after session) may have
limited the validity of OQ-45 results as a means of providing feedback regarding the
accuracy of therapists’ judgments, given that therapists may have been estimating client
status at a different point in time than clients were reporting it. Current results were also
influenced by initial differences between groups at baseline. Judgment accuracy as
measured by hit rates was higher at the outset for therapists in the feedback condition;
outcome accuracy was similar between groups. The observed effect was therefore
shaped largely by chance variability at baseline.
Individual therapists varied widely in judgment accuracy, by either measure of
accuracy. Individual differences in judgment accuracy were moderately stable when
accuracy was assessed through the correlation method (but not when assessed by hit
rates). It remains unclear, on the basis of current data, whether the ability to make
accurate judgments of client progress has applied benefit in psychotherapy. Presumably,
therapists who are more attuned to client progress would have advantages in recognizing
poor responses early and adjusting treatment plans. Additionally, judgment regarding
progress is important in deciding when to discontinue treatment; accurate judgment
would therefore be expected to contribute to the efficient use of therapy resources.
However, these possibilities remain theoretical and are in need of further investigation.
The overall rate of change observed in the current sample was relatively flat;
clients demonstrated a mean reduction in OQ-45 Total Scores of 0.53 points per session,
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after controlling for unequal observations across therapists. It is worth noting that a
majority of clients in the current study were seen at the CICFC, a low-cost community
mental health clinic in which clients are often seen over the course of one or more years.
Therefore, a high proportion of clients in the sample were not in the initial phase of
treatment and treatment response might therefore have reached a plateau, consistent with
research on the dose-effect relationship in psychotherapy (e.g., Howard et al., 1986;
1993). Despite the relatively limited rate of change, a moderate effect of feedback was
observed; clients whose therapists received feedback demonstrated a mean reduction of
0.77 points per session, in comparison to a mean reduction of 0.04 points for clients in
the no-feedback condition. This trend was consistent with a burgeoning research
literature supporting the treatment utility of progress feedback to therapists (e.g., Brodey
et al., 2005; Lambert, 2007; Slade et al., 2006).
The current study examined the relationship between clinical judgment and client
outcomes. It is notable that although there was a trend for feedback to lead to improved
rates of therapeutic change, feedback did not lead to improved clinical judgment
accuracy. Furthermore, the accuracy of therapists’ judgments regarding the progress of
individual clients was statistically unrelated to the rate of change experienced by the
clients. Clinical judgment, therefore, was not shown in the current study to contribute
meaningfully to client outcomes. It seems likely that the therapeutic effects of feedback
owe to separate mechanisms, which have not yet been demonstrated empirically. One
possibility is that therapists spend more time thinking about clients for whom they
receive feedback; Percevic, Lambert, and Kordy (2004) described this possibility as the
“attention effect.” Increased attention may also lead to increased empathy or alliance.
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This possibility may be examined by administering process measures in addition to
outcome measures and examining the effect of feedback on process variables.
The most notable effect of feedback in the current study was on therapists’ ratings
of confidence in the accuracy of their judgments. When making estimates regarding
change from both the first session and the most recent session, therapists who received
feedback reported lower confidence over the course of the study, as compared to
therapists who did not receive feedback. The statistical magnitude of this effect was
large in both cases, although the absolute magnitude of change in confidence ratings was
modest. Regarding overall confidence levels, therapists tended to be highly
overconfident regarding their judgments, with mean confidence ratings above 80 percent.
The decrease in confidence ratings therefore appears to have been an appropriate
response to feedback, given that confidence ratings were consistently too high, even after
they decreased somewhat due to feedback.
Interestingly, confidence ratings were negatively related to judgment accuracy;
therapists who reported higher confidence ratings tended to demonstrate lower hit rates.
Given that confidence was negatively related to judgment accuracy (consistent with some
previous research; Arkes, 1981), and that therapists tended to be overconfident, this
appears to represent a desirable outcome of feedback administration. Particularly among
therapists in training, the reduction of overconfidence may provide clinicians with a
degree of humility regarding the limitations of clinical judgment and inference.
Somewhat inconsistently, therapist calibration did not improve as a function of receiving
feedback. However, the reliability of this latter finding may be limited, given that both
components of calibration scores (hit rates and confidence ratings) were calculated on the
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basis of small sets of 5 judgments. It seems likely that a general trend of decreased
confidence ratings would lead to better calibration over a longer period of observation.

Limitations
Several limitations should be noted in interpreting current results. A primary
limitation was the small sample size of therapists who provided sufficient data for
analyses (N = 10, 5 therapists in both conditions). A repeated-measures design was
utilized in order to maximize the number of observations and increase the reliability of
individual variables for each therapist; however, the small sample size limited statistical
power. Thus the results were presented primarily based on effect sizes and other
descriptive statistics. All conclusions are therefore tentative, awaiting a study of
sufficient size to employ inferential statistics.
Another consideration germane to the generalizability of results is the nature of
the current sample of therapists. With one exception, therapists were first-year
practicum students in a doctoral clinical psychology program. The sample was
reasonably diverse in terms of gender and ethnicity; however, the extent to which current
results would generalize to clinicians at varied levels of training and experience, and in
various professional disciplines, remains unknown.
The accuracy of therapists’ judgments was measured in two methods in the
current study. However, both methods rely upon clients’ self-reported OQ-45 data as the
criterion measure of progress. Although self-report measures of distress have the
advantages of objectivity and statistical reliability, no single measure of outcome or
progress is completely sufficient. Measurement of client progress would ideally be based
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upon a multi-method assessment incorporating various approaches (e.g., self-report,
observation, other-report, external behavioral data, or other-clinician ratings). Reliance
upon the OQ-45 was necessary in the current study due to practical limitations.
In order to evaluate criterion variables such as judgment accuracy and calibration,
it was necessary to select baseline and outcome groups of observations for each
individual therapist; for example, the correlation between therapists’ and OQ-45
estimates of change could not be meaningfully examined by simply grouping one
observation from each therapist within conditions. The first and last 5 observations for
each therapist were therefore utilized as baseline and outcome periods. The selection of 5
sessions was somewhat arbitrary and was largely based upon the limited number of
sessions available for some therapists. Although more reliable than a single observation,
correlations utilizing only 5 pairs of data are highly influenced by single values; current
results are therefore considered preliminary. Future studies should incorporate larger
sample sizes with more sessions completed.

Conclusions and Future Directions
The current results did not provide support for the hypothesis that feedback would
improve clinical judgments regarding client progress. However, there was a trend for
clients whose therapists received feedback to improve at a faster rate than clients whose
therapists did not receive feedback. It appears unlikely that improvement in clinical
judgment was a significant mechanism in the therapeutic effects of feedback. Future
studies should continue to explore potential mechanisms of change.
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Although feedback did not improve the accuracy of clinical judgments, it did
impact therapists’ confidence ratings regarding their judgments. Although study
therapists remained overconfident across the course of data collection, those who
received feedback demonstrated reduced confidence ratings, in comparison to therapists
in the no-feedback condition. As noted above, the reduction of confidence ratings
appears to have been a desirable outcome. Programs designed to improve clinical
judgment, and more specifically to reduce overconfidence in judgments, would benefit
from the incorporation of feedback regarding the accuracy of judgments made.
Additionally, the clinical impact of overconfidence among clinicians is relatively
unexamined. Future studies may examine potential clinical correlates of therapists’
confidence regarding clinical judgments. This might be addressed through a processoriented approach examining a variety of variables over time (e.g., outcomes, number of
sessions attended, number of sessions completed before making significant treatment
decisions, proportion of clients referred to outside providers, frequency of consultation,
etc.).
The number of sessions completed (and subsequent judgments made) by each
therapist was related to several other variables. As the number of judgments increased,
judgment accuracy increased (more notably for accuracy as defined by correlation),
confidence ratings decreased, and calibration improved. It appears therefore that
repetition with the judgment task was beneficial. Repetition (i.e., making repeated
judgments regarding client progress, across several clients) appeared to be more
influential than feedback in increasing judgment accuracy. On the basis of such results, it
appears that providing clinicians with experience related to the specific judgment to be
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made is important in developing clinical judgment. Although experience has been
inconsistently related to the accuracy of clinical judgment across judgment literature, the
current results support Westen and Weinberger’s (2004) position that experience with the
specific judgment task, rather than general clinical experience, is essential in making
valid clinical judgments. Experience effects may therefore be more notable when
experience is considered in relation to the specific judgment task, rather than as a raw
amount of time spent in clinical training and service. The effect of repetition with a
judgment task on the accuracy of judgments may be examined through experimental
methods in which the number of judgments made is systematically varied.
In summary, although the current study did not find support for feedback as a
means of improving judgment accuracy, feedback did affect confidence ratings in an
apparently desirable manner. Feedback may therefore be an important aspect of training
programs related to clinical judgment and reducing overconfidence. Current results were
also consistent with a growing body of research supporting feedback to therapists as a
positive intervention for clients. Additionally, the present data suggest promising lines of
further research on clinical judgment. In particular, the effect of repeated experience
with a specific judgment task on judgment accuracy should be examined.
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APPENDIX
MEASURES

Therapist Registration Form.
Please think of a 4-digit code number (e.g. 2345) that you will remember and use
throughout the study. Creating a code number will allow us to keep your responses
completely anonymous.
1. Code number: ______________
2. What is your highest level of education obtained in a mental health field?
□ Doctorate (Ph.D., Psy.D., Ed.D.)
□ Masters (M.A., M.S., M.F.T., Ed.M.)
□ Bachelors (B.A./B.S.)
3. What is your mental health field? (check one)
□ Clinical Psychology
□ Counseling Psychology
□ Educational Psychology
□ Marriage and Family Therapy
□ Other
4. For how long (in months or years) have you conducted psychotherapy (including
training experience)? ____________________
5. Have you previously utilized the OQ-45 in clinical practice?
IF YES:

□ Yes □ No

For approximately how long? _____________________
Did you receive computer-generated feedback?
□ Yes □ No

Please provide your demographic information on the following page but DO NOT
write your code number on that page.
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Participant Demographics

Age: ___________________
Gender:

□ Female

□ Male

Ethnicity: _________________________

Please see the next page regarding a drawing for a gift card. After completing all
pages, separate the three pages and place them in the research drop box in random
order.
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Entry for Gift Card Drawing

Thank you for your participation in this research. If you would like to be
eligible to win one of two $25 gift cards to Barnes and Noble, please provide
your email address below. The drawing will be held following data
collection and winners will be notified via email.

Email address: _________________________________________________
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Therapist Estimate of Change

Client #: ______________
Date of Session: ________

Therapist ID (4-digit code): _________________
Number of sessions you have had with this client: _______
(include current session)

If this was your first session, check here _____ and do not complete the remainder of
form.
1. In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed since the previous session?
1
Much
Worse

2
Somewhat
Worse

3

4

5

6

Slightly
Worse

No
Change

Slightly
Improved

Somewhat
Improved

7
Much
Improved

How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment regarding the direction of change
(worse, no change, or improved) since the previous session?

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2. In your judgment, how has your client’s status changed since your first session with the
client?
1
Much
Worse

2
Somewhat
Worse

3

4

5

6

Slightly
Worse

No
Change

Slightly
Improved

Somewhat
Improved

7
Much
Improved

How confident are you in the accuracy of your judgment regarding the direction of change
(worse, no change, or improved) since your first session?

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%
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80%

90%

100%
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